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B Y  E L D E R  Q U E N T I N  L . C O O K  O F  T H E  Q U O R U M  O F  T H E  T W E L V E
am grateful to be with you this evening. I have always enjoyed being
with lawyers.    Let me take this opportunity to express my heartfelt
gratitude to our Church general counsel: Elder Lance B.Wıckman,
- - - - -
This talk was presented at a 
J. Reuben Clark Law Society fireside at 
the Church Conference Center in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, on March 13, 2009.
- - - - -
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William Atkin, and Boyd Black. They render
magnificent service to the Church overseeing
the General Counsel’s Office.
I am sure each of us here has a reason we
decided to attend law school. The genesis 
of my own decision to become a lawyer
came from two sources. The first was my
father. His uncle, David S. Cook, had been 
a successful attorney and had created in 
my father a favorable disposition toward
the law. (Incidentally, this uncle had roomed
with Albert E. Bowen at the University 
of Chicago Law School. Elder Bowen, of
course, was later an apostle.) In addition to
his uncle, my father had utilized lawyers in
his various businesses, and as he used to say,
in a tone that made it clear he wasn’t serious
and with a big smile, “Lawyers have a license
to steal.” To be completely fair, he used the
same language to describe doctors. I suppose
that, viewed from the competitive business
world in which he was involved, the law
seemed like a pretty safe haven. My guess
would be that most of us here would not 
concur with my dad’s assessment, particu-
larly with the difficult economic times many
lawyers are experiencing today.
The other person who influenced my
decision to become a lawyer was my second
mission president, Elder Marion D. Hanks,
who is also a lawyer. In a serious conver-
sation I had with him near the end of my
mission, I told him the educational options 
I was considering. He told me that he thought
I should pursue a legal education. From that
very moment my decision was made. It wasn’t
just because he said it, but because I knew he
was right.
While I thoroughly enjoyed the practice
of law, I did not feel inclined to influence our
children toward any particular occupation.
Nevertheless, two of the three did become
lawyers and are both here this evening: my
daughter, Kathryn, who after a 14-year hiatus
raising four wonderful children has returned
to part-time legal practice; and my son,
Larry, who practiced for a time on Wall
Street for Sullivan and Cromwell and is now
a partner in a private equity firm.
I should also mention that I have two
cousins who are distinguished lawyers, and
they are both here. One is Judge Dale Kimball,
who is a federal district judge here in Salt
Lake; and the other is Kimball Johnson, 
who is in the Utah Attorney General’s Office.
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Kimball’s son is attending the University of
Utah Law School and is here tonight with
some of his classmates.
As I began preparing for this talk and
paying more attention to what is being said
today about lawyers and the law, I was inter-
ested in an article in the January 12, 2009,
issue of Forbes magazine and in a subsequent
account in the New York Times by Evan R.
Chesler. Mr. Chesler is the presiding partner
at Cravath, Swain & Moore, and the Forbes
article was entitled “Kill the Billable Hour,”
with a subheading of “Lawyers Should Bill
the Way Joe the Contractor Does.”1 I have to
admit that there were three aspects to my
interest in his statements. First, I have always
had a soft spot in my heart for the Cravath
firm. In 1966 when I graduated from law
school as a new lawyer, Cravath increased the
“going rate” by a few hundred dollars to a
magnificent sum exceeding $8,000 per year
for beginning lawyers. My new firm decided
to match that rate, and I was the grateful ben-
eficiary of what at that time seemed like a sig-
nificant increase. Lest you think we were
starving to death, very adequate homes could
be purchased for $20,000–$30,000 in those
days. Second, Mr. Chesler described himself
as the presiding partner of his firm. That is
new terminology to me. When I was practic-
ing, the term was managing partner. But even
then it seemed like an oxymoron. Managing
lawyers, an almost impossible task, has always
resembled the oft-quoted comparison to herd-
ing cats. Third, and most important, any-
thing that would take away the burden of
billable hours would constitute an improve-
ment to the legal profession.
When I was a second-year law student 
at Stanford University, a visiting professor
arrived to teach first-year constitutional law.
His name was Arvo Van Alstyne, and he was
then a law professor at ucla. He had also
been president of the Los Angeles California
Stake. He was teaching constitutional law to
half of the first-year class. The constitutional
law teacher for the other half was Gerald
Gunther, who had clerked for both Judge
Learned Hand and Chief Justice Earl Warren.
He had been my teacher the previous year. 
In the first few days of class, Professor Van
Alstyne informed his students that he was a
committed member of the lds Church. He
explained to them that as part of his faith he
believed that the United States Constitution
was divinely inspired. He said he wanted 
them to know about his personal beliefs and
predilections. He recognized that the students
would need to reach their own conclusions.
This announcement made quite a stir at
the law school and engendered both discus-
sion and humor. The students would inquire
of each other, “Do you attend the inspired
constitutional law class or the uninspired con-
stitutional law class?”
My intent here this evening is not to deliver
a scholarly discourse on the u.s. Constitution.
However, before I speak to the two concepts I
do want to cover, a historical overview of how
some have viewed the inspired aspects of the
u.s. Constitution might be interesting. Both
President J. Reuben Clark and Elder Dallin
H. Oaks, two apostles who had previously
been eminent lawyers, share a common view
of our understanding that the Constitution 
is divinely inspired. Neither of them has seen
every word of the Constitution as being
inspired. Elder Oaks has said, “[Our] reverence
for the United States Constitution is so great
that sometimes individuals speak as if its every
word and phrase had the same standing as
scripture.” He continues, “I have never consid-
ered it necessary to defend [that possibility].”2
President J. Reuben Clark enunciated a simi-
lar view in an address given in 1939.3 I concur
with their assessment.
President Clark saw three elements 
of the Constitution as being particularly
inspired. First is the separation of powers
into three independent branches of govern-
ment. Second is the guarantee of freedom of
speech, press, and religion in the Bill of
Rights. And the third is the equality of all
men before the law.
Elder Oaks, while concurring with
President Clark on these three elements, also
includes the federal system with the division
of powers between the nation as a whole and
the various states and the principle of popu-
lar sovereignty. The people are the source of
government. 
I think most of us would agree with
President Clark and Elder Oaks that these
incredibly significant fundamental principles
elegantly combined in the constitutional doc-
uments are indeed inspired and coincide with
doctrinal principles in our scriptures. It does
not require detailed analysis of the Constitution
to see that these five basic fundamentals have
been a great blessing to the United States
and were necessary as a precursor to the
Restoration of the gospel of Jesus Christ.
I understand that some who are listening
by satellite are in foreign countries. Many of
the above principles had their antecedents in
legal doctrines and philosophies established
in Europe and particularly in Great Britain.
My purpose this evening is to let the
founding u.s. documents—the Declaration
of Independence, the Constitution, and the
Bill of Rights—frame just two concepts that
I will discuss in broad, practical terms. I
believe the concepts are as applicable interna-
tionally as they are in the United States.
PUR SU I T  O F  H A P P I N E S S
The first is the concept of happiness. Much
has been written about the meaning of the
words “We hold these truths to be self-evi-
dent, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are 
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”4
The British political philosopher John Locke
is credited with those enduring concepts.
George Mason, Thomas Jefferson, and other
Founding Fathers weighed into the writing 
of this language. With respect to the word
happiness, there was at least some element of
protecting possessions and property. For oth-
ers, the concept of safety was also important. 
But it is clear that for the authors of the
Declaration, happiness was something more
than material well-being and the possession of
property. One writer described it this way:
Happiness has to do with a life well lived, or a good
human life as a whole; it involves the achievement
and practice by a person of such virtues as courage,
decency, and charity, virtues that are entirely within
a person’s own power to attain.5
I have been amazed by the number of
articles in the last two or three years that
have focused on happiness. It is clear, for
instance, that nations rich economically
aren’t necessarily happier than poor ones.
Also, people at all income levels say they
would be happy if only they made more
money. The message of many magazines
today is we’re never quite happy enough. 
Elder Oaks and I were in Beijing, China,
a little over a year ago. An editorial in the
China Daily was titled “Finding the Right
Path to Happiness for All.” The editorial indi-
cated that despite significant increases in
material wealth, people don’t feel any happier.
A few paragraphs from this Chinese newspa-
per editorial might be interesting to you.
Growing stress from work and study is making
many people blue, as high pressure and long hours
offset the happiness brought by economic well-being. 
This is also true for school children. Often
spoiled, these little emperors and empresses don’t
smile as much as they should, weighed down by
excessive homework and endless tests. They also
play less and are physically less fit compared with
their parents’ generation.
While the divorce rate soars . . . the outcome is
often damaging—especially for young children.
Deteriorating morality and manners are also
getting people down. . . . Loneliness is also playing a
role, as interpersonal relationships become more com-
plicated and people living in urban concrete jungles
lose their sense of community. . . .
Focusing on [gross domestic product growth]
is not the right path to happiness.6
This debate about prosperity and hap-
piness has been going on for a long time. 
The great Anglican theologian Frederic W.
Farrar, in The Life and Work of St. Paul, wrote
of the grandeur of ancient Greece, particularly
of Athens. He asserted that those who believe
government, culture, philosophy, business,
science, or other worthy pursuits can bring
permanent happiness are mistaken. He stated:
Had permanent happiness . . . been among the rewards
of culture; had it been granted to man’s unaided power
to win salvation by the gifts and qualities of his own
nature, and to make for himself a new Paradise . . .
then such ends would have been achieved at Athens in
the day of her glory.7
He concluded that they definitely were not
achieved.
The relationship between happiness and
religion that was acknowledged by Farrar has
been evident to almost all who have studied it.
John Tierney, writing in the New York Times,
December 30, 2008, stated: “Researchers
around the world have repeatedly found that
devoutly religious people tend to do better in
school, live longer, have more satisfying mar-
riages, and be generally happier.”
The Church’s doctrine leads to true hap-
piness, and I will discuss that later. But there
are issues relating to happiness with which
many people struggle.
DON ’ T  U N D ER E S T IMAT E  
Y O UR  A C C OMP L I S HMENT S  
A ND  C A PAB I L I T I E S
Almost all studies of happiness indicate that
the relationship between how we think we
are doing compared to others is more impor-
tant than our actual circumstances. Arthur C.
Brooks, who has written extensively on this
subject, says it this way: 
Imagine two people who are the same in income,
education, age, sex, race, religion, politics and fam-
ily status. One feels very successful; the other does
not. The former is about twice as likely to be very
happy about his or her life than the latter. And if
they are the same in perceived success but one earns
more than the other, there will be no happiness dif-
ference at all between the two.8
Many years ago a very wise consultant
helped me understand this in a way that was
meaningful to me. I was running a health care
system and had just been called as an Area
Authority. I had just returned from a stake
conference in San Diego and was feeling that
the talks I had given were less meaningful
than I would have liked them to be. There
were some merger issues in the business that
the consultant was helping us resolve.
He took me to a whiteboard and went
through the following analysis. He asked,
“What are some of the skills that are inherent
in what you are trying to do?” We then listed
those skills on the whiteboard. I don’t
remember them exactly, but some of them
were giving talks, providing inspired leader-
ship, working with others, delegating, and
other similar skills. He then asked me to list
the individuals I had met in my lifetime who
were the very best in each of the designated
areas. I was surprised that in many of the skill
areas, I knew immediately who I thought
was the best. For instance, I knew that my
mission president, Elder Marion D. Hanks,
was as good a speaker as I had ever encoun-
tered whether it was a prepared talk or one
spoken extemporaneously. The quality of
content and delivery was exceptional. 
With respect to delegation I immediately
identified a former stake president, David
Barlow. He was the president of the Ortho
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Division of Standard Oil, now Chevron, and
he was absolutely spectacular with respect to
delegation. I can still remember, as a new high
councilman assigned to the youth, reporting
to him on some challenges that I thought our
young people were experiencing. He immedi-
ately concurred with my assessment and then
asked, “What is the solution?” I had to admit
that I had thought deeply about the problem
but had no solution as yet to propose. He
helped me define what I was looking for and
then set a specific time for us to meet to dis-
cuss a proposed solution that I was expected to
bring to the next meeting. His success in both
Church and business was most remarkable,
and a significant part of that was his unusual
ability to delegate and hold people accountable.
The consultant had me list additional
people for each of the other skills or talents.
Most of them I was able to identify very
quickly. As I recall, there were approximately
10 of these skills. He then listed them across
the top of the whiteboard and asked me,
using an a, b, c grade formulation, to iden-
tify how each of these superstars performed
in the other nine areas. To my great amaze-
ment, I realized that no one got straight As
across the board. Most had significant num-
bers of Bs, and many had some Cs.
The consultant then pointed out that we
often compare ourselves with the a+ per-
formers in each category that we value, and
then we feel inadequate and unsuccessful in
what we are doing. As the studies I have men-
tioned indicate, when we feel unsuccessful
we feel unhappy.
You might ask why I am sharing this with
you. Law and the process of becoming a
lawyer are very competitive. The respect for
credentials can reach an inappropriate level
where they are virtually “idols.” In addition,
client expectations, regardless of the legal spe-
cialty, often exceed any realistic outcome. This
can be exaggerated by the crushing impact of
losing cases, sometimes in a public setting. In
the hothouse environment of the law, there are
many people who are very skilled, and there is
always somebody who seems to be better in all
the ingredients that make up the qualifications
to be a lawyer. Notwithstanding these issues, 
I would ask, “Do we have to be an A in every-
thing to be happy? Do we have to be so hard
on ourselves?” The scriptures do, of course,
address happiness, but not in terms of material
or academic success or skill or professional
achievements.
Our doctrine is set forth succinctly in
Mosiah 2:41. King Benjamin taught:
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I would desire that ye should consider on the blessed
and happy state of those that keep the commandments
of God. For behold, they are blessed in all things,
both temporal and spiritual; and if they hold out
faithful to the end they are received into heaven, that
thereby they may dwell with God in a state of never-
ending happiness. O remember, remember that these
things are true; for the Lord God hath spoken it.
I was impressed a while back by an edito-
rial page article in the Wall Street Journal writ-
ten by Steve Salerno. The title was “The
Happiness Myth.” He remembered asking his
dad when he was 13, “Are you happy?” His
father answered, “Son, a man doesn’t have
time to think about that. A man just does
what a man needs doing.” He then recited a
second encounter with his father. He said his
dad told him, “Life isn’t built around fun. It’s
built around peace of mind.”9
That resonated with me as I read it, because
one of my favorite scriptures is Doctrine and
Covenants 59:23: “But learn that he who doeth
the works of righteousness shall receive his
reward, even peace in this world, and eternal
life in the world to come.”
I would suggest a better list to put on the
whiteboard would have been the attributes
and teachings of the Savior. That is the list
that, without comparing ourselves to others,
we should be striving to achieve and would
allow us to have the peace I have just
described.
When the Missionary Department was
working on the new missionary guide, Preach
My Gospel, we knew that to be successful,
missionaries needed to emulate the Savior.
We also felt that if missionaries seriously
worked on Christlike attributes, it could
become a lifelong quest that would supersede
the kind of comparisons I have described. I
respectfully submit that members of the legal
profession would be blessed if they did not
underestimate their accomplishments and
capabilities.
F R E E D OM  O F  S P E E CH  A ND  
F R E E D OM  O F  R E L I G I O N
The second concept I want to touch on this
evening is the constitutional provision that
the United States Congress would “make no
law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”10 My
emphasis is religious freedom and the practi-
cal participation of people of faith in govern-
ment. In speaking of the u.s. Constitution,
John Adams said, “Our Constitution was

made only for a moral and religious people.”11
James Madison, known as the Father of the
Constitution, added his view that there had
to be a “sufficient virtue among men for 
self-government.”12 Thomas Jefferson favored
protection of religion and conscience, but he
also wanted freedom from religion.13
The history of the members of our
Church has caused us to be vigilant on free
speech and freedom of religion issues. In our
early Church history, the vast majority of our
members were antislavery.14 This was prior
to the Civil War and was a major element—
along with our religious beliefs—in the hos-
tility, the mob violence, and, ultimately, the
extermination order issued by Governor
Boggs of Missouri.15 The Prophet Joseph
lamented that the u.s. Constitution was not
“broad enough to cover the whole ground”
and the federal government could not inter-
vene when the state militia expelled the
Mormons from Missouri.16
During the past year and a half, the
Church has experienced many issues that
have highlighted the significance of freedom
of religion. At the direction of the First
Presidency, Elder Ballard and I, chairman and
vice chairman, respectively, of the Church
Public Affairs Committee, have visited with
many members of the media as well as leaders
of other faiths. Let me review some of these
visits. In the latter part of 2007 and the early
part of 2008, we visited with the editorial
boards of 12 newspapers, magazines, and
journals. These included several influential
newspapers such as the Washington Post, usa
Today, the Boston Globe, the Wall Street
Journal, and the Chicago Tribune.
In addition, we visited the editorial
boards of diverse magazines such as u.s. News
& World Report, the National Review, and the
New Republic.More recently we have met with
broadcast media. For instance, in January of
this year, we escorted many of the media
through the new Draper Utah Temple open
house. We were interviewed by Dan Harris
of abc for his Nightline program. Other
equally significant media entities were visited.
One purpose of the visits was to explain
to the media the neutrality the Church main-
tains in partisan politics. We do not support
political parties or political candidates. We
explained to them that we do not allow dis-
cussions of political parties or candidates to
be made from our pulpits. We do not distrib-
ute cards indicating for whom members
should vote. We pointed out to them that we
have faithful members of the Church in the
various political parties and used as examples
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and senior
Republican senator Orrin Hatch.
We told them that we always reserve the
right as a Church to take specific positions on
moral issues. From time to time the Church
has done this. When the Church does take a
position, it does so in a public and transpar-
ent manner. The Church does not tell legisla-
tors how to vote. Legislators and members
are always free to vote their conscience.
We then opened the discussions to ques-
tions from them. There were two questions
that were asked by almost every editorial
board. The first was: “Why are you so secre-
tive?” When we probed on this question, we
were surprised to find that in virtually every
case these highly educated, well-informed
people believed that one had to be invited by
a member of the Church to attend a Latter-
day Saint meeting. Elder Ballard and I were
astounded, having both recently been in the
Missionary Department, working with the
53,000 missionaries trying to get every inves-
tigator to attend Church; we could not
believe what we were hearing. It soon
became clear that they were all confusing our
temples with our meetinghouses. We were
able to explain to them that we have approxi-
mately 20,000 chapels, where meetings are
held every Sunday that anyone can attend
without permission. We have 128 operating
temples, which were open to the public
before their dedication and where tours were
given to explain what occurs in the temple.
Then they are dedicated to the Lord and are
closed, because they are sacred—not because
they are secret.
The vast majority of the media were sur-
prised to learn that an unpaid lay leader
presided over the ward and branch units.
They were also surprised to find that women
participate in giving talks and prayers at our
most sacred meeting, sacrament meeting. 
Turning to the second question that was
uniformly asked—and remember, some of
this was during the Romney for President
Campaign in the u.s.—“Why do some peo-
ple take the position that you are not
Christians?” They had in front of them our
cards describing us as apostles of The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. We told
them that we are neither Catholic nor
Protestant. We are restored New Testament
Christians. We explained to them that if they
wanted to know how Latter-day Saints live
their lives, they should look at the Savior’s
teachings in the New Testament. We attempt
to emulate Christlike attributes. We were
pleased to report to them our demonstrated
efforts to help the poor, the sick, and the
needy. Our commitment to fasting and giv-
ing offerings to assist those in need is a mar-
velous Christian effort. Faithful home and
visiting teachers bless lives in a most remark-
able, Christlike outreach.
We pointed to the concluding chapters
of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, where
the Risen Lord asked His disciples to preach
His gospel and feed His sheep. We noted that
in this dispensation over a million missionar-
ies have served. We acknowledged that at
some times to some people it feels like the
missionaries are invading their privacy, but
we noted that the Savior’s commandment
requires us to preach His gospel.
In most of the meetings there was a dis-
cussion of the Nicene Creed to which we do
not adhere because of the revelations received
by the Prophet Joseph Smith. I would have to
say that they seemed far more interested in
the fact that we worship the Savior and emu-
late His teachings than in deep theological
differences with other Christians. 
Again, I want to note that we were well
received and treated with great respect. Of
course, there were numerous other questions
that I do not have time to review tonight. In
many of these meetings, and particularly in
follow-up conversations, the issue was raised
by some of the media suggesting that the
Church and its members be more vigorous
with respect to answering legitimate ques-
tions people have about our faith and also in
dealing with some of the bigotry that occurs. 
ACT I V E  P AR T I C I P ANT  
O R  S I L E N T  O B S E RV ER ?
My concluding and perhaps most important
purpose is to invite you highly educated and
talented individuals to do what the media has
suggested. Additionally, I would like to chal-
lenge you to contemplate how you can
improve the society in which you live.
Participating in government and asserting
righteous principles in the public square
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would be a commendable and much needed
goal. Many times your particular talents are
needed to defend our faith. 
What exactly are we asking you to do?
First, you will not speak for the Church itself.
Only the First Presidency and those author-
ized from time to time by them will speak for
the Church. We are asking you as individuals
to respond appropriately and in a Christlike
fashion whenever and wherever it is necessary.
Elder Ballard, speaking at byu–Hawaii
and byu–Idaho, asked our young students 
to become more involved, particularly with
respect to the Internet.17 The emergence of
the Internet has generated countless world-
wide conversations on a huge range of sub-
jects, including religion. As we all know,
many Internet conversations are about the
Church. We see them on blogs, in readers’
letters to online publications, in YouTube
videos, and in a variety of other formats.
These conversations go on whether or not we
choose to participate in them.
Most people, even in America, are uncer-
tain what to make of Latter-day Saints. If
they know a Latter-day Saint personally, they
often have a good impression. But they also
hear harsh or mean-spirited criticisms or
accusations against the Church. By training,
experience, and judgment, you are among
the Church’s most articulate and thoughtful
members. So what is your responsibility dur-
ing this period of unusual public attention
and debate? As Elder Ballard asked a byu
Marriott School of Management Society
audience last year in Washington: “Are you
going to be an active participant or only a
silent observer?”
Elder Ballard went on to say: “Church
leaders must not be reluctant to participate in
public discussion. Where appropriate, we
will engage with the media whether it’s the
traditional, mainstream media or the new
media of the Internet. But Church leaders
can’t do it all, especially at the grass-roots
community level. While we do speak author-
itatively for the Church, we look to our
responsible and faithful members to engage
personally with blogs, to write thoughtful,
online letters to news organizations, and to
act in other ways to correct the record with
their own opinions.”18
Neither is it always about correcting
information. Sometimes it’s as simple as shar-
ing your personal life experiences to show
how your values and faith intersect, whether
it’s how you as a parent engage with your
teens, or whether it’s how you find the time
to volunteer in good causes. Countless mem-
bers of the Church are now doing this. One
example I recently became aware of is called
The Daily Scoop. It is written by a Church
sister in Las Vegas. This good woman experi-
enced a tragic loss of a child in her family and
began writing her blog to help her get
through it. People began to notice, and she
developed a following as she wrote about
dealing with adversity. Often she doesn’t
mention the Church at all, but sometimes she
does. For instance, she posted comments
from a talk given by Elder Joseph B. Wirthlin
at the last general conference on meeting
adversity. Some of the responses from non-
members are impressive as they relate to her
circumstances. For some it may have been
their first encounter with a Latter-day Saint.
She comes across as real, thoughtful, intelli-
gent, and dealing with the same problems
that many others face, but in a remarkable
way that allows gospel values to shine.
As people sense the common ground
they share with you and engage in conversa-
tions intelligently, they will relate to your val-
ues. I’m well aware that part of the Internet is
occupied by people who like to abuse and
scream at each other rather than discuss
things or, as the Atlantic Monthly recently
reported, who seem to fit somewhere
between bigotry and stupidity.19 It’s not all
like that. Those sites attract their own follow-
ers, but you can rise above that by reading
and commenting on the more thoughtful
sites and engaging in more respectful dia-
logue, sharing your values, and speaking out
for the Church when required.
Many of you are not involved in the
Internet, but the principles for being engaged
in traditional media are similar. As you partic-
ipate, regardless of the media involved,
remember who you are. You are Latter-day
Saints. Where possible, be peacemakers.
Explain your beliefs in gentle, loving terms.
Be wise, thoughtful, considerate, and friendly.
I am grateful that we have reached the
point where there are thousands of faithful
Latter-day Saint lawyers across the world. The
dream of Church leaders when the J. Reuben
Clark Law School and this Law Society were
established is being fulfilled. I am not sure
you can fully comprehend how significant
you are and what you collectively accomplish
in blessing mankind and building the king-
dom of God here on earth. 
You have my appreciation, respect, and
best wishes.
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This criticism has acquired particular res-
onance as “originalism” has come to dominate
debates about constitutional interpretation.
The most widely defended version of this
interpretive theory, “public-meaning original-
ism,” holds that the contemporary meaning of
a constitutional provision is the meaning that
was understood by the people who lived at the
time that the provision was proposed by
Congress and ratified by the states.
An entrenched conventional wisdom holds
that substantive due process is inconsistent
with an originalist understanding of the Due
Process Clauses of both the 5th and 14th
Amendments, since by their terms they appear
to protect only rights to legal process. With
respect to the 5th Amendment in particular, 
an overwhelming scholarly consensus main-
tains that its Due Process Clause protects only
procedural rights. Accordingly, an originalist
defense of substantive due process under the
5th Amendment Due Process Clause would be
significant. First, it would legitimate funda-
mental substantive rights that bind the federal
government only by application of the doctrine
of substantive due process, such as rights to
“fundamental fairness” in criminal and civil
proceedings,2 and to equal protection of the
laws.3 Second, because yet more conventional
wisdom holds that the original meanings of 
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the doctrine of “substantive due process” refers to the supreme court’s long and con-
troversial practice of using the due process clauses of the 5th and 14th amendments to
constitutionalize fundamental rights that do not appear anywhere in the constitu-
tion. the doctrine debuted to mixed reviews in chief justice taney’s infamous dred scott
opinion,1 and criticism of it has been a fact of american constitutional life ever since.
the 5th and 14th Amendment Due Process
Clauses are identical, a originalist defense of 5th
Amendment substantive due process would
place the burden on opponents of the doctrine
to explain how and why an understanding of
the Due Process Clause that encompassed sub-
stantive due process in 1791 had vanished by the
time the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause
was ratified in 1868. And finally, an originalist
defense of 5th Amendment substantive due
process would demonstrate that originalism is
consistent with the common-law judicial pro-
tection of unenumerated fundamental rights
championed by constitutional liberals since the
mid–20th century.
MAGNA  C AR TA
It is universally agreed that the concept of
due process of law is rooted in a provision of
Magna Carta, or the “Great Charter”: 
No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised
or outlawed or exiled, or in any way ruined, nor will
we go or send against him, except by the lawful judg-
ment of his peers and by the law of the land.
Later English statutes defined the “law of 
the land” as due process of law, or “procedure
by original writ or by an indicting jury,”4 an
equation that entered into English common
law and was eventually absorbed into the
English constitution.5
In 1628—more than 400 years after
Magna Carta—Sir Edward Coke canonized
the fundamental-law status of the Great
Charter and the law of the land in England
with his theory of higher-law constitutional-
ism. In Coke’s view, the English constitution
did not vest sovereignty in the king but rather
in the common-law and the courts.6 Magna
Carta and common-law liberties constituted
law that was higher than the actions of roy-
alty, nobility, or Parliament, law that limited
what these groups could do even by consen-
sus.7 As law possessed of a more fundamental
status than ordinary statutes, Magna Carta
Originally written in
1215, Magna Carta
bound England’s
sovereigns to the
rule of law and laid
the groundwork for
the U.S. Constitution
and Bill of Rights.
and the law of the land had a status prior to
and more foundational than the actions of the
king and even Parliament.8 This English “con-
stitutionalization” of Magna Carta and the
law of the land is evident in Coke’s confronta-
tion with King James I over the respective
jurisdictions of common law and ecclesiasti-
cal courts, in judicial opinions authored or
reported by Coke—notably Bonham’s Case
and several antimonopoly cases—and, most
clearly, in Coke’s monumental Institutes of the
Law of England published at the end of his life.9
AMER I C AN  TH I NK I NG
The drafting and ratification history of
the 5th Amendment Due Process Clause dis-
closes virtually nothing about its original
public meaning. However, no legal com-
mentator, not even Blackstone, had more
influence on the American revolutionaries
than Coke. Consequently, questions about
due process of law and its protection of
unenumerated rights were at the heart of
American constitutional thinking during
the Revolution and its aftermath.
NATURA L  R I GH T S
The colonists could not rely directly on
Coke’s higher-law constitutionalism because
revolt necessarily entailed withdrawal from 
the English constitutional system that higher-
law constitutionalism sustained. Thus, the
Declaration of Independence opened with a
declaration of natural rights rather than funda-
mental customary rights of English common
law. But in short order it moved to a long list of
common law grievances, including indefinite
dissolution of colonial legislatures, veto of an
independent colonial judiciary, maintenance of
standing armies in the colonies, quartering of
troops in the colonists homes, embargoing
colonial trade, imposing of taxes without colo-
nial representation in Parliament, and depriv-
ing colonists of trial by jury. The Declaration
even accused the king of combining with
Parliament to subject the colonies “to a juris-
diction foreign to our constitution and unac-
knowledged by our laws,” thereby implying the
existence of an unwritten colonial constitution
analogous to the unwritten English one, and
echoing higher-law constitutional arguments
about natural and customary rights that were
then widespread among the colonists.10
In short, the Declaration’s basic argu-
ment—that Britain’s violation of natural and
customary rights justified revolution—fit
neatly with Coke’s 17th-century notion that
the law of the land and due process of law lim-
ited the actions of both king and Parliament.
H I GHER - L AW  CONS T I TU T I ONA L I SM
That revolutionary Americans carried
higher-law constitutionalism into independ-
ence is reflected in post-independence state
constitutions and judicial decisions. Because
natural and customary rights were believed
to exist independent of any writing, it was
not necessary to enumerate them in a consti-
tutional text or otherwise to enact them into
positive law in order for them to limit the
actions of the newly framed state govern-
ments.11 This distinction is evident in the 
language used in the written constitutions
enacted by about half of the states following
independence, which “created” the frames of
state government but merely “declared” or
“guaranteed” natural and customary rights.
Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia main-
tained this distinction from the start, while
Delaware, New Hampshire, and Kentucky
(upon its admission) followed suit within a
generation.
Some judicial decisions and arguments of
counsel following the Revolution also drew
upon higher-law constitutionalism,12 although
others relied solely on constitutional texts enu-
merating fundamental rights.13 A much-con-
tested speech by Alexander Hamilton in the
late 1780s also supports the view that higher-
law constitutionalism was influential in the
states following independence.14
The strongest judicial statement of
higher-law constitutionalism prior to 1791 is
Ham v. McLaws.15 There, a South Carolina
court considered the state’s imposition of a
fine and forfeiture for illegal importation of
slaves against a family that had been in transit
on the high seas when the importation ban
was enacted. Conceding that defendants fell
within the strict letter of the statute, the
court nevertheless declared that “statutes
passed against the plain and obvious princi-
ples of common right, and common reason,
are absolutely null and void, as far as they are
calculated to operate against those princi-
ples,” and held that the statute not did not
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Roger B. Taney, chief
justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court and
staunch supporter of
slavery, used the Fifth
Amendment’s Due
Process Clause in
writing the majority
opinion in the infa-
mous Dred Scott v.
Stanford case.
apply to the defendants, reasoning that this
was “consistent with justice, and the dictates
of natural reason, though contrary to the
strict letter of the law.”16
P OW E R  O F  T H E  F E D E R A L  J U D I C I A R Y
The 1787 Constitution enumerated very
few individual rights and liberties, and even
the few it did were criticized by delegates to
the Philadelphia Convention as “irrelevant
and useless.” 17 Even so, Antifederalists imme-
diately made the Constitution’s lack of a
national bill of rights a ratification issue. The
Federalists maintained that an enumeration
of natural and customary fundamental rights
and liberties was unnecessary because the
Constitution did not delegate to the national
government any power to infringe upon
such rights,18 and was dangerous because it
would be impossible to enumerate all of 
the rights and liberties individuals held.19
Both arguments rested on two assumptions
explicitly voiced by Federalists in the ratifi-
cation debates: that natural and customary
rights existed independent of the federal
Constitution and any other text, and that
the federal judiciary would be empowered to
invalidate acts of Congress or the state legis-
latures intruding upon such rights.20 Indeed,
Hamilton’s discussion of judicial power in
The Federalist essay is permeated by the
expectation that the federal courts would
defend unenumerated natural and custom-
ary rights against federal encroachment.21
         
In sum, when Madison set out to draft
the 5th Amendment Due Process Clause and
the rest of the Bill of Rights in 1790, the
higher-law constitutionalism of Coke and the
English 17th century had been adopted,
adapted, and embedded in American consti-
tutional thinking. In particular, the notion of
due process of law associated with the law of
the land guarantee of Magna Carta was
widely understood to include a residual guar-
antee of substantive liberty against arbitrary
actions of government, including (especially)
the state legislatures.
DE F I N I T I ON  O F  “ L AW ”
Defenses of substantive due process often
founder on the text: How does one get substan-
tive rights from a text that seems so tightly
focused on procedure? This very question reflects
the projection by contemporary interpreters of
a positivist meaning onto the term “law” in the
crucial phrase “due process of law” that the
framers did not share. In this positivist under-
standing, a law is any legislative or other gov-
ernmental act that has satisfied the formal
requirements for making a law. Under this
reading, Congress complies with the Due
Process Clause—that is, it satisfies due process
of law when it deprives a person of life, liberty,
or property—so long as it accomplishes the
deprivation by means of a congressional act
passed in accordance with the lawmaking pro-
visions set forth in Article I of the Constitution.
By contrast, in the 1790s, classical natural
law theory had long assigned normative as
well as positivist content to the definition of
law. To fall within the meaning of law in the
classical view, a legislative or other govern-
mental act required more than mere positivist
compliance with a rule of recognition; it also
needed to be just.22 Cicero, for example,
maintained that an unjust statute is not a law,
even though clearly adopted and accepted by
the nation it governs.23 Augustine likewise
suggested that “a law that is not just is not a
law.”24 Aquinas formalized this view into an
argument, concluding that, since law derived
its essential character from its conformity to
“right reason,” whose “first rule is the law of
nature,” a law that violates the natural law “is
no longer a law but a corruption of law.”25
The classical natural law tradition was
still vibrant in late-18th-century America,
when the 5th Amendment was drafted and
ratified, and the term “law” had not yet
acquired the almost entirely positivist conno-
tation that it carries today. To call a legislative
act a law during that era did not mean that the
act merely satisfied constitutional require-
ments for lawmaking, but rather it signified
that it conformed to substantive limitations
on legislative power represented by natural
and customary rights. Legislative acts that
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William Blackstone argued in his Commentaries 
on the Laws of England that positive law that was 
not in accord with natural law was no law at all.
violated these limitations would not have been
considered laws, even when they satisfied the
constitutional requirements for lawmaking.
Such acts might have given due process, in
other words, but the process owed and given
would not have been a process of law.26 Under
this reading, the Due Process Clause required
that a congressional deprivation of life, lib-
erty, or property be accomplished by a law,
and to be a law, a congressional act must not
have exceeded the limits of legislative power
marked by natural and customary rights.
There is substantial evidence that late-
18th-century American lawyers read the Due
Process Clause in this manner. Legal diction-
aries from the late–18th century repeat
Aquinas’ argument nearly verbatim.27 Echoing
Aquinas, and notwithstanding his ideas
about parliamentary supremacy, Blackstone
similarly concluded that there is no obligation
to obey human laws that violate the natural
law, since such laws have no validity or
force.28 And even in England, members of
the parliamentary Whig opposition argued
that the more extreme acts passed by
Parliament to punish colonial intransigence
were not law even though properly enacted.29
The classical understanding of law is
implicit in the ubiquitous language of nullity
and voidness that runs throughout late-18th-
century judicial decisions and arguments of
counsel involving legislative acts held to have
violated natural or customary rights.30 Then,
as now, a void law had no existence; it made
sense to think of it as never having been a
law at all. This understanding was some-
times even made explicit.
For example, the classical theory’s norma-
tive definition of “law” is expressly invoked in
Van Horn’s Lessee v. Dorrance, a case involving a
boundary dispute between Pennsylvania and
Connecticut that the states settled by legisla-
tively vesting title to disputed property in cer-
tain claimants at the expense of others. Justice
Paterson charged the jury that the legislature’s
act of “divesting one citizen of his freehold,
and vesting it in another, without a just com-
pensation” was “void” because it violated natu-
ral and customary rights. This meant, he
explained, that the settlement act “never had
constitutional existence; it is a dead letter, and
of no more virtue or avail, than if it never had
been made.”31
The classical view is also explicit in
Marbury v. Madison, in which Chief Justice
Marshall famously held that “an act of the leg-
islature, repugnant to the constitution, is
void.” In considering whether courts are
bound to enforce an unconstitutional law,
Marshall expressly assumes that a legislative
act found to be void because of its inconsis-
tency with the constitution, is not really a
law: “If an act of the legislature, repugnant to
the constitution, is void, does it, notwith-
standing its invalidity, bind the courts, and
oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other
words, though it be not law, does it constitute a
rule as operative as if it was a law?”32
Finally, the classical understanding of law
is clearly evident in state judicial condemna-
tions of the positivist construction of law in
late-18th-century decisions construing the
meaning of the law of the land. These deci-
sions are illustrative of the original meaning
of the Due Process Clause, because late-18th-
century Americans understood the meanings
of  due process of law and the law of the land
to be virtually identical.33 Two judges in
Zylstra v. Corporation of Charleston emphati-
cally held that a city charter that permitted
the levying of fines without trial by jury could
not be considered part of the law of the land
even if authorized by the legislature:
How then can a law be valid, which constrains a cit-
izen to submit his person and his property, to a tri-
bunal that proceeds to give judgment on both,
without the intervention of a jury? Does [sic] these
words of the constitution “or by the law of the
land,” authorize it? Do they mean any law which
may be passed, directing a different mode of trial?
Such a construction would be incompatible with the
declaration of this privilege; it would be taking away
all the security which that intended to give it; it
would do more, it would be making the constitution
itself authorize the means of destroying a right which
it afterwards declares shall be inviolably preserved.
For if a law may abridge the trial by jury, it may
also abolish it; and this great privilege would be held
only at the will of the legislature.34
The author of this opinion cited its reasoning
in Lindsay v. Commissioners to invalidate a
municipal taking, arguing that if “the lex terrae
meant any law which the legislature might
pass, then the legislature would be author-
ized by the constitution, to destroy that
right, which the constitution had expressly
declared, should be inviolably preserved,” and
dismissing this reading as “too absurd a con-
17c l a r k  m e m o r a n d u m
struction to be a true one.”35 Trustees of the
University of North Carolina v. Foy similarly
rejected the positivist construction when it
invalidated a state legislature’s unilateral revo-
cation of title to property that the legislature
had previously conveyed, reasoning that if
the legislature was empowered to alter the
law of the land at will, the protections of law
of the land clauses were nonexistent.36
Perhaps the clearest statement of the clas-
sical understanding of law is the oft-quoted
dictum of Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull, a
United States Supreme Court decision
handed down in 1798, only seven years after
ratification of the 5th Amendment.37 The
Court unanimously held in Calder that a spe-
cial state statute ordering a new trial of a dis-
puted will after the running of the statute of
limitations for appeal was not ex post facto leg-
islation prohibited by the Constitution.
Justice Chase additionally opined that the
protection of natural and customary rights
was the very purpose of state constitutions,
which would be subverted if state legislative
power was not subject to natural and custom-
ary law limits, regardless of whether such
Justice Samuel Chase
opined that the pro-
tection of natural and
customary rights was
the very purpose 
of state constitutions.
founding era. Indeed, it was precisely the anar-
chic consequences stemming from absolutist
state legislatures that led to the Philadelphia
convention.42 The supremacy and sovereignty
of Parliament, therefore, is an unlikely consti-
tutional authority to raise less than a genera-
tion after the Revolution was fought to
vindicate its constitutional opposite.43
Iredell’s position, moreover, was almost
uniformly rejected by state constitutional
decisions of the period, which, as we have
seen, generally held that the law of the land
signified natural and customary rights that
constrained legislative action and could not be
altered by the ordinary exercise of legislative
power. In addition to its inclusion in legal dic-
tionaries published during the late–18th cen-
tury, the classical understanding of law was
reflected in frequent references to voidness in
constitutional decisions of that era, and was
expressly invoked in the majority opinions of
one state and two federal courts, including
the u.s. Supreme Court. Finally, two state
court seriatim opinions had used the classical
understanding as a premise in rejecting the
positivist argument that state legislatures had
unrestricted power to alter the law of the land
by ordinary enactment. By contrast, the only
judicial authority clearly adopting the posi-
tivist construction of law argued by Justice
Iredell in Calder is an opinion reluctantly
announced in State v. _____,44 which was
overruled by Foy barely a decade later. On bal-
ance, then, the late-18th-century legal authori-
ties strongly support the position that the
conventional understanding of law in the
1790s was that of classical natural law theory.
Against the backdrop of colonial adop-
tion and adaptation of Coke’s higher-law
constitutionalism in the pre-Revolutionary
era, the drafting and ratification of the 1787
Constitution and the 1791 Due Process
Clause of the 5th Amendment, together with
decisions reported during the period imme-
diately before and after ratification, provide
strong evidence that due process of law was
originally understood to include judicial
enforcement of unenumerated natural and
customary rights as limitations on congres-
sional power, and was not limited to a mere
guarantee judicial process. Whatever other
criticisms might be made of substantive due
process, its inconsistency with the original
understanding of the 5th Amendment Due
Process Clause is not one of them.
Frederick Mark Gedicks is Guy Anderson Chair
and professor of law at the J. Reuben Clark Law
School at Brigham Young University. 
This essay is condensed from a much longer
article, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due
Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism,
and the Fifth Amendment, 58 Emory L.J.
585–673 (2009), a copy of which may be down-
loaded at <http://www.ssrn.com/id=1072284>.
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limits were written into the positive law of
the state constitutions:
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a State
Legislature, or that it is absolute and without con-
trol; although its authority should not be expressly
restrained by the Constitution, or fundamental
law, of the State. . . .
There are acts which the Federal, or State,
Legislature cannot do, without exceeding their
authority. There are certain vital principles in our
free Republican governments, which will determine
and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of leg-
islative power; as to authorize manifest injustice by
positive law; or to take away that security for per-
sonal liberty, or private property, for the protection
whereof of the government was established.38
As examples of acts beyond proper legislative
authority, Chase suggested a law that “pun-
ished a citizen for an innocent action, or, in
other words, for an act, which, when done,
was in violation of no existing law; a law that
destroys, or impairs, the lawful private con-
tracts of citizens; a law that makes a man a
judge in his own cause; or a law that takes
property from A and gives it to B.”39
Chase then directly invokes the classical
view, arguing that because such actions violate
natural and customary rights, they are not
truly law, even when enacted pursuant to the
constitutionally prescribed procedures for law-
making: “An Act of the Legislature (for I cannot
call it a law) contrary to the great first principles
of the social compact, cannot be considered a
rightful exercise of legislative authority.”40
Justice Chase’s famous invocation of the
classical understanding was directly chal-
lenged by the equally famous dictum of Justice
Iredell in the same case. Citing Blackstone,
Iredell argued that the only judicially enforce-
able limits on legislative power were those pos-
itively enacted into a constitutional text.41
The historical context of the 1790s when
Justice Iredell wrote this dictum suggests 
that Chase’s position was the more conven-
tional. Blackstone’s doctrine reflected the con-
stitutionalism of parliamentary supremacy
against which higher-law constitutionalism
was deployed by the American revolutionaries.
Post-independence state constitutions, argu-
ments of counsel, and judicial decisions 
make clear that higher-law constitutional-
ism remained the conceptual foundation of
American constitutional thinking through the
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he Easter season to me is a wonderful season.
I would like to share with you some of the
events that occurred during the life of Christ
during the last week of His life. There will not
be time to read extensively from the scrip-
tures. If you had perhaps an entire year, you
could probably study this topic in great detail.
Each July when we have a little break as
General Authorities, we are encouraged to be
at home, to be with family. Each of us tries to
use that time for preparation for the next year.
Several years ago I took the opportunity in
the month of July to study these events. I did
it in this manner: I had on one part of my
table the four Gospels: Matthew, Mark,
Luke, and John. I had Jesus the Christ by
James E. Talmage. Then I had a third book
called The Life of Christ by Frederic Farrar.
Frederic Farrar was a German born in 1831, a
year after the Church was organized. He was
not a member of the Church. But in 1879 he
wrote this marvelous book. It is quite a well-
versed doctrinal history of the life of Christ
and compares very similarly with what we
read in our Church literature, particularly in
Jesus the Christ.
I took time to review each of the Gospels
because they vary. The synoptic Gospels vary
a little bit, as you would expect, as they are
written by different authors. Matthew was
written to convince the Jews that Jesus is the
Christ. Mark was written more for the com-
mon people. Luke was a very literary writing
that appealed more to the Greeks. And John
in his writing focused on the more spiritual
manifestations of the life of the Savior. Each
of them is different; some include events that
others do not. But as a group, as a synopsis,
they tell this marvelous story. As law stu-
dents, I am sure you like to do research: read-
ing and studying notes that go with the text,
and precedents and court cases. Study this
subject using the four Gospels, the other
books that I have referenced, and the foot-
notes that appear at the end of each chapter of
Jesus the Christ. It is a great opportunity to see
the similarities and the differences.
I would like to start with the beginning
of the week preceding the Crucifixion and
the Resurrection. Sometime about the first 
of the week, the Savior made His triumphal
entry into Jerusalem. The Christian world
celebrates that date as Palm Sunday. You’ll
find in the scriptures the references of how
He came into Jerusalem, how they laid palms
in front of Him. I also would like to share
with you some of the messianic prophecies
that foretell of events that are referenced in
the New Testament.
Fortunately, the Book of Mormon is
many times more elaborate in its messianic
prophecies of the Savior, but I am going to
focus on some of the Old Testament mes-
sianic prophecies. For example, referring to
His triumphal entry into Jerusalem, we read
the following in Zechariah 9:9:
Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion; shout, O
daughter of Jerusalem: behold, thy King cometh unto
thee: he is just, and having salvation; lowly, and rid-
ing upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass.
That is quite descriptive of the triumphal
entry of the Savior into Jerusalem. Now,
Jesus was one to honor the local customs,
and, of course, this was the week of the
Passover. He came to celebrate the Passover,
the feast of the unleavened bread. In His time
they would put the blood of the lamb on the
altar. He honored the local customs and all
that went with them.
But as He proceeded into Jerusalem, He
instructed His disciples to go out into the
street, where they would find a man who
would invite them to use his home for 
the special meeting Christ had planned 
for the disciples. Of course this referenced 
the upper room. This man recognized the 
apostles, and that gave them access to this
upper room.
It is important to note the way the Jewish
people numbered the hours in their days. A
day would begin at what we consider 6:00
p.m. For example, it is now 7:40 p.m. on
Sunday evening, but under the Jewish calen-
dar, this would be the beginning of Monday.
So on Thursday evening before 6:00 p.m., it
would be Thursday, and after 6:00 p.m. it
would be the beginning of Friday. Probably
around sundown, Jesus and the disciples
went into this upper room. One of the first
events that occurred was the disclosing of
who would betray the Savior. Judas had
already determined with the elders that he
would betray the Savior. As they sat down in
this upper room, the Savior announced,
“Verily, verily, I say unto you, that one of you
shall betray me” ( John 13:21). Of course they
looked at one another, and some said, “Is it I?
Is it I?” And then:
Jesus answered, He it is, to whom I shall give a
sop, when I have dipped it. And when he had dipped
the sop, he gave it to Judas Iscariot, the son of
Simon.
And after the sop Satan entered into him.
Then said Jesus unto him, That thou doest, do
quickly. . . .
He then having received the sop went immedi-
ately out: and it was night. [ John 13:26–27, 30]
I thought it was most interesting that
after Judas left, there was some very vital
instruction that probably could not have been
given if he had been present in the room. As
Judas left, the Savior began to teach. One of
the first things He did was teach about serv-
ice, and He did this by washing the disciples’
feet. Remember that Peter did not want the
Savior to wash his feet, and the Savior said,
“If I wash thee not, thou hast no part with
me” (John 13:8). Then Peter said, “Not my feet
only, but also my hands and my head” (v. 9). 
Then Jesus taught them about the Lord’s
Supper (this is when the sacrament was intro-
duced, the breaking of the bread and the
wine). He taught them new commandments
that they love one another as He loved them.
Then He prepared them for their future and
some of the challenges they would have.
Peter, of course, stepped forward and offered
to lay down his life in exchange for the Savior
not having to suffer some of these things.
That is when the Savior turned to Peter and
told him that before the cock crowed, Peter
would deny Him three times.
After He taught them, He left the upper
room and went to the Mount of Olives. For
those who have been to Jerusalem, you know
that the city is separated from the Mount 
of Olives and the Garden of Gethsemane by 
the Kidron Valley, which is quite a steep
ravine. But, nevertheless, sometime later in
the evening they departed. The rest of His
instructions occurred as they were walking or
arriving at the Mount of Olives.
This was the beginning of the test period
that came to the disciples. Of course Judas
had already failed; he was no longer with
them. But this is when Jesus taught that in
His Father’s house were many mansions. “If
ye love me, keep my commandments. And I
will pray the Father, and he shall give you
another Comforter,” which is the Holy Ghost
( John 14:15–16). He taught the principle that
the Holy Ghost is the third member of the
T
Godhead and then the wonderful allegory of
the 15th chapter of John regarding the true
vine and its branches.
Then He gave what is referred to as the
great Intercessory Prayer, or the Lord’s high
priestly prayer. For all of you, especially 
you returned missionaries, of course, this is 
chapter 17 of John. Let me read these several
verses as an instruction of almost this entire
chapter:
And this is life eternal, that they might know
thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom
thou hast sent.
I have glorified thee on the earth: I have fin-
ished the work which thou gavest me to do. [ John
17:3–4]
The Savior then speaks of unity—a won-
derful prayer for the unity of the people and a
prayer for the unity of His Twelve:
Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also
which shall believe on me through their word;
That they all may be one; as thou, Father, art
in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us:
that the world may believe that thou hast sent me.
[ John 17:20–21]
The entire 17th chapter of John is one of
the most beautiful prayers in all of scripture.
All these things were said at the Mount of
Olives. Then they sang a hymn and departed
for the Garden of Gethsemane (which, as I
remember, is down the hill a bit from the
Mount of Olives). When they went into the
entrance of the Garden of Gethsemane, the
Savior instructed the eight disciples to remain
there and to pray and to watch over Him. He
took Peter, James, and John and went into
the center of the Garden of Gethsemane, and
He told them to pray and to be on guard.
Alone, He went into the garden and prayed.
There is not much we know about this
prayer. In fact, Elder McConkie, speaking of
the prayer in the Garden of Gethsemane,
indicated that we have but a sliver of a great
tree as to what Jesus said. The most quoted
portion of that prayer is this statement: “O
my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass
from me: nevertheless not as I will, but as
thou wilt” (Matthew 26:39).
I have always enjoyed this paragraph
from Farrar’s The Life of Christ; listen to the
beauty in which he described this event in
Gethsemane:
As he went into Gethsemane, it was with a total
awareness of what lay ahead. “Jesus knew that the
awful hour of His deepest humiliation had arrived—
that from this moment till the utterance of that great
cry with which He expired, nothing remained for
Him on earth but the torture of physical pain and the
poignancy of mental anguish. All that the human
frame can tolerate of suffering was to be heaped upon
His shrinking body; every misery that cruel and
crushing insult can inflict was to weigh heavy on His
soul; and in this torment of body and agony of soul
even the high and radiant serenity of His divine spir-
it was to suffer a short but terrible eclipse. Pain in its
acutest sting, shame in its most overwhelming brutal-
ity, all the burden of the sin and mystery of man’s exis-
tence in its apostasy and fall—this was what He must
now face in all its most inexplicable accumulation.”
[Bruce R.McConkie, The Mortal Messiah,4 vols.
(Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1979–1981),
4:126; quoting from chapter 57 of Frederic W.
Farrar, The Life of Christ (1874)]
There is no language known to mortals
that can tell what agony and suffering was
His while in the Garden of Gethsemane:
blood ran from the pores of His body.
As He was going through this experi-
ence, He got up three times, and each time
He found that the apostles were asleep. I
wonder how He must have felt that even His
trusted three and His trusted eight were not
able to remain on guard as He had instructed
them. So great was His pain that we’re told
that a heavenly messenger appeared to Him
to strengthen Him while He was suffering
this lonely vigil and individual struggle.
About this time, as He concluded this
experience in the garden, the soldiers came
accompanied by Judas, and we read how
Judas betrayed Jesus. He made a pact with 
the guards that the individual he would kiss
was the one they should arrest. That’s exactly
what Judas did. He kissed the Savior and then
quickly left, and the Savior was taken.
Now, going back to Judas, let me share
with you two messianic prophecies that tell
of this event. In Psalm 41:9 we read: “Yea,
mine own familiar friend, in whom I trusted,
which did eat of my bread, hath lifted up his
heel against me.” And in Zechariah 11:12–13, it
tells what happened next in the life of Judas:
And I said unto them, If ye think good, give
me my price; and if not, forbear. So they weighed
for my price thirty pieces of silver.
And the Lord said unto me, Cast it unto the
potter: a goodly price that I was prised at of them.
And I took the thirty pieces of silver, and cast them
to the potter in the house of the Lord.
Judas, when he left the Garden of
Gethsemane with the 30 pieces of silver,
came to himself as he came into the temple
where the priests and the elders were gath-
ered, and he realized what he’d done. He
took the 30 pieces of silver and cast them
down on the floor of the temple and ran out
and hanged himself. The priests picked up
these 30 pieces of silver and with them
bought what was referred to as the potter’s
field, which was to become a burial place for
the indigent and strangers.
At this time all of the apostles, except
Peter and possibly John, disappeared. The
Savior had instructed them that they should
leave. But Peter lingered and followed, and it’s
quite possible that John did also. This would
have been sometime in the middle of the
night, possibly after midnight, which would
be Friday according to our time. The soldiers
took the Savior first to the house of Annas,
the father-in-law of Caiaphas, the high priest.
All of this took place probably between 
midnight and sunrise on Friday morning. If
you look at a map of where the Garden of
Gethsemane is and where you would have to
pass through the Kidron Valley up the other
side to go into the city of Jerusalem, you’ll see
that these locations are quite some distance
and that it’s not an easy walk. 
When they got to the house of Caiaphas,
all of the high priests and the elders were
waiting for Christ to come; they knew that
He had been captured, that Judas had
betrayed Him, and that now He was to come
in and they were going to find some charge
that would bring about His death. And so
they conducted what is referred to as a trial.
Now, as you know, the Jews did not have the
liberty of inflicting death on a person, and so
they had to focus on finding Christ guilty of
something. So they began to question Him,
and they began to bring in witnesses who
could testify against Him—the scriptures
refer to them as false witnesses. Two wit-
nesses testified of something the Savior had
said earlier. In Matthew, one person said,
“This fellow said, I am able to destroy the
temple of God, and to build it in three days”
(Matthew 26:61). In Mark 14:56–58 we read:
23c l a r k  m e m o r a n d u m
For many bare false witness against him, but
their witness agreed not together.
And there arose certain, and bare false witness
against him, saying,
We heard him say, I will destroy this temple
that is made with hands, and within three days I
will build another made without hands.
Now, you can go to John 2:19 to read
what He actually said as recorded at the wed-
ding in Cana several years earlier in His min-
istry. Speaking to the Jews who asked for a
sign, “Jesus answered and said unto them,
Destroy this temple, and in three days I will
raise it up.”
He did not say “I will destroy.” He sim-
ply said, “Destroy this temple, and in three
days I will raise it up.” We know why each
of the false witnesses were false; they made
reference that He said “I will destroy” and “I
will raise it up.” His accusers took these two
witnesses and this testimony as evidence
that He was guilty of sedition, or that He
was a disturber of the peace. But they
needed more, so they began to ask Him
who He was. And finally they asked Him 
if He was the Christ, the Son of God, 
and Jesus said, “Thou hast said” (Matthew
26:64). His reply was evidence of blas-
phemy, because now He was saying that He
was Jesus the Christ or the Savior whom
they expected to come. So they had these
two charges: blasphemy, which is the most
serious charge under Jewish law, and high
treason, or sedition, which is the most seri-
ous charge under Roman law.
On the basis of that, they felt they had the
means now to go to the Roman governor and
to seek a penalty. When all of this was taking
place in the house of Caiaphas, Peter was
somewhere close by. A woman turned to Peter
and said, “Art not thou also one of [them]?”
and Peter said, “I am not” ( John 18:17; see also
v. 25, 27). This occurred three times. As the
cock crowed, Peter suddenly remembered the
statement that the Savior had said. Now, let
me read Luke 22:60–62, which I think is prob-
ably the best account of godly sorrow.
And immediately, while he yet spake, the cock crew.
And the Lord turned, and looked upon Peter.
And Peter remembered the word of the Lord, how
he had said unto him, Before the cock crow, thou
shalt deny me thrice.
And Peter went out, and wept bitterly. 
Imagine how Peter must have felt to
know that the Lord knew that he had denied
Him three times. His later life would testify
that he went out in true godly sorrow and
true repentance because he later became the
president of the Church. That was a very
defining moment in the life of Peter to have
this occurrence.
From there they went to Pontius Pilate,
the Roman governor over all of Judea, and
they encouraged him to seek some sort of
death penalty for the Savior. But Pilate sim-
ply said, “I find no fault in him” ( John 19:4;
see also Luke 23:4 and John 18:38). In great
frustration they left Pilate and went to the
home of Herod Antipus, the tetrarch over
Galilee. Now this was the man who had
beheaded John the Baptist, and it was his
father, Herod the Great, who ordered the
slaying of all the babies a couple years after
Christ was born. So you get some idea of
this family—the father slaying all of the
children at the birth of the Savior and
Herod Antipus killing John the Baptist,
beheading him.
Herod began to question Christ, and the
scriptures record that to all of the question-
ing by Herod, the Savior said nothing—He
did not utter one word. Talmage said that
Herod is likely the only person who ques-
tioned the Savior but never heard His voice. 
I think the Savior did not dignify that indi-
vidual by even speaking to him. In fact,
Herod was the only person known about
whom Christ made a contemptuous refer-
ence, when on one occasion He told the
apostles, “Go ye, and tell that fox” (Luke
13:32). Well, they left Herod and went back
to Pilate, in great frustration because Herod
would not impose a penalty. Now, under
their law during the season of the Passover, it
was permissible to release a prisoner, and so
Pilate offered to release a prisoner. Of course
the priests did not want that, and that’s
where you have the story of Barabbas, a mur-
derer, being released. Once again Pilate
found no fault in Christ and even washed his
hands in evidence that he found no fault, no
blasphemy or sedition.
But because the people were becoming
so pleading and so boisterous—and, we don’t
know, maybe out of fear—Pilate finally suc-
cumbed, and he agreed that he would inflict
the Roman sentence of death by crucifixion
because that is what they wanted.
Now, sometime when you have an oppor-
tunity, read the 34th chapter of Jesus the Christ.
In the footnote there are 12 points of the ille-
gality of the trial by night, and, as lawyers,
future lawyers, and law students, you should
find it most interesting to read those three
pages, as each aspect of that trial that took
place that evening under Jewish law was ille-
gal. But nevertheless it occurred, and they
were able to extract a penalty from Pilate.
We are told that at that point they
scourged Him, probably stripping the cloth-
ing from the upper part of His body, which
they lashed with a leather whip embedded
with tiny pieces of bone that would be sharp
like a razor. As He was whipped, the pieces of
bone would be embedded in and cut His flesh. 
They spit in His face. They put a blind-
fold on Him, and different people would
strike Him on the face and say, “Prophesy,
who is it that smote thee?” (Luke 22:64). 
And, of course, the Savior said nothing and
endured it. They put a crown of thorns on
His head.
They put a reed representing a royal
scepter in His right hand to signify that He
was a king. They saluted Him as king of 
the Jews, and, of course, as they went to
Golgotha, He was required to carry His own
cross, which He did for a while—but due to
exhaustion, another individual assisted Him.
Finally, He was crucified between two crimi-
nals. You know the manner of crucifixion:
one’s arms would be outstretched and large
nails would be driven through the palms and
the wrists of the hands and through the
ankles to hold the body to the cross, and then
the cross would be put into a hole, where it
would remain upright. A sign was put on the
cross: “The King of the Jews.” And then He
was mocked: “If thou be the king of the Jews,
save thyself ” (Luke 23:37). They kept saying,
“If thou be Christ, save thyself ” (v. 39). Of
course this “if ” was a reference to His 40 days
of fasting when He was tempted by Satan
(see Matthew 4:6–10). Then finally the Savior
asked for water; He said, “I thirst” ( John
19:28). But He was given vinegar instead of
water.
Let me read to you several of the mes-
sianic prophecies that foretold of the events
that occurred on the cross. In the book of
Psalms we read, “For dogs have compassed
me: the assembly of the wicked have inclosed
me: they pierced my hands and my feet”
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(Psalm 22:16). In Isaiah 22:23 we read, “And I
will fasten him as a nail in a sure place; and he
shall be for a glorious throne to his father’s
house.” Again, in Psalm 22:18: “They part my
garments among them, and cast lots upon
my vesture.” You remember that the soldiers
cast lots for the clothing that they had taken
from His body. In Psalm 69:20: “Reproach
hath broken my heart; and I am full of heavi-
ness: and I looked for some to take pity, but
there was none; and for comforters, but I
found none.” In the book of Psalms He then
said what we know as His final statement.
Before I read that, let me read one other verse
from Psalm 69:21: “They gave me also gall for
my meat; and in my thirst they gave me vine-
gar to drink.”
Let me just point out the chronology of
this: According to scriptural references, we
believe that the Savior was nailed to the cross
sometime in what was referred to as the
“third hour.” They would number their hours
starting with 6 a.m. being the first hour, 7
a.m. the second, 8 a.m. the third, and so
forth. He was put on the cross sometime in
the third hour. Sometime in the sixth hour,
being about noontime, darkness came across
the land and lasted for three hours. We
believe He expired sometime around the
ninth hour, or around 3:00 p.m.
Just before He expired He turned to His
apostle John and gave him charge to take care
of His mother, Mary. We are told He then
uttered these words: “My God, my God, why
hast thou forsaken me?” (Matthew 27:46;
Mark 15:34). In that bitterest hour of His suf-
fering, Christ was truly alone. He then said,
“It is finished” ( John 19:30) and  “Father, into
thy hands I commend my spirit” (Luke 23:46).
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i have glorified thee on the
earth: i have finished the work
which thou gavest me to do.
john 17:4
He lowered His head and voluntarily gave 
up His life. That is where this messianic
prophecy that I read from the book of Psalms
comes in: “Into thine hand I commit my
spirit: thou hast redeemed me, O Lord God
of truth” (Psalm 31:5). Then, again, in Psalm
22:1 (a psalm of David): “My God, my God,
why hast thou forsaken me? why art thou so
far from helping me, and from the words of
my roaring?”
And so, as we read, the Savior voluntarily
gave up His life and died. You have read the
accounts, not only in Talmage’s Jesus the Christ
but also in many other books, that relate the
cause of His death as likely being a ruptured
heart. The sword being thrust into His side
and the combination of blood and water
coming forth is a good description of how
that would be medical evidence of a ruptured
heart. That is why I like the reference in
Psalm 69:20: “Reproach hath broken my
heart; and I am full of heaviness.” It was truly
of a broken heart that He died. 
Well, now it’s about sundown on Friday,
and of course to the Jews this would be a hor-
rible desecration of the Sabbath to have these
bodies on the cross at the beginning of their
Sabbath. By custom they would immediately
cause death by breaking the bones of the feet
and legs, and when that occurred, the body
would slump down in death. When they
came to the Savior, He had already died, so
His legs were not broken. We read again in
Psalm 34:20: “He keepeth all his bones: not
one of them is broken.” So, very quickly, as it
became sundown they took Christ down
from the cross, and Joseph of Arimathaea, a
righteous, wealthy man, made available his
tomb where His body could be laid. We are
told that Nicodemus—a great friend of the
Savior who came to Him early in His ministry
and enquired about his mission—brought
myrrh and aloes, and primarily the women
took the body and wrapped it in clean linen
with spices and brought it in haste and laid it
in the sepulchre. Pilate had instructed his sol-
diers that they were to guard the tomb in case
Christ’s worshippers came to steal the body,
as was rumored. They rolled a large stone
across the opening, and the soldiers were
placed there to guard the entrance.
The body lay in the tomb that Friday
evening, which was now the beginning of the
Saturday in the Jewish calendar, and was there
all day Saturday. When you visit Jerusalem,
the guides show you a location where they
claim the sepulchre was located. We believe it
was at the Garden Tomb. Several of our
prophets (including President Harold B. Lee,
Spencer W. Kimball, Howard W. Hunter,
and Gordon B. Hinckley) have borne witness
that the Garden Tomb is the correct location.
Now, moving to early Sunday morning,
Mary Magdalene and the other women knew
and recognized that they simply had not had
time to properly prepare the body for burial.
When the women arrived there, the stone
had been rolled back, and the tomb was
empty. The women were told by an angel
that He had risen and that they were to go tell
the apostles. So the women went and found
the apostles and told them. Peter and some 
of the disciples quickly ran to the tomb, and
when they arrived there they went in and also
found the tomb empty and the linen that had
covered His body neatly folded. They did not
understand, so they left. Then Mary came
back alone, and she saw two personages who
were angels, and she asked if they knew where
His body was. Mary went outside the tomb
and saw a man whom she thought was the
caretaker of the garden, and He said to her,
“Woman, why weepest thou? whom seekest
thou?” ( John 20:15). She replied, thinking that
someone had taken the body of Jesus, and
then this man simply said to her: “Mary” (v.
16). She recognized the voice and manner in
which He said, “Mary.” Of course she was
speaking to the resurrected Christ.
All of the writings are a witness to the
fact that the first person to see the resurrected
Savior was a woman, Mary Magdalene. She
quickly went and informed the apostles of
what she had seen. Of course the Savior went
to the 10 disciples—Thomas not being with
them at this time—and showed them His
hands and His feet and His body and broke
bread with them and ate. Thomas, really not
believing this, said that unless he could thrust
his hand into His side and touch the nail
prints, he simply would not believe. That’s
where we get the term “Doubting Thomas.”
The Savior appeared to Thomas individually
and gave him that witness, and Thomas then
became a believer of the Resurrection. The
Savior appeared to several people on the road
to Emmaus.
The Savior also appeared to over 500 as
recorded by Paul. Of course He visited the
Nephites, and then as He ascended into
heaven, He appeared to the disciples. As you
read this account, you can only believe that
the Resurrection was literal—the flesh-and-
bone body came back and joined with Him.
He ate, He consumed food, and they touched
Him and felt a human being.
Now these events, my brothers and sisters,
usher in a whole topic of the Resurrection
and the Atonement. The greatest event that I
can think of that has occurred in our world is
the Resurrection of Jesus Christ and His put-
ting in place the Atonement and providing
the opportunity for us to return to Him. His
disciples became His witnesses, and that is
what they did for the balance of their lives—
they bore witness of what they had seen.
Most of them lost their lives through persecu-
tion, with many of them dying in exactly the
same way the Savior died.
Then we have the long period of apos-
tasy and the ushering in of this dispensation
through the Prophet Joseph Smith, and for-
tunately today we have not only these wit-
nesses of the Bible but also the witnesses of
the Book of Mormon, and we have the living
witnesses of the apostles and prophets who
live and walk the earth today.
I bear this witness of these men who are
true witnesses; they are charged to bear wit-
ness of Jesus Christ of their own knowledge,
not on any other person’s knowledge but to
acquire their own knowledge that Jesus is the
Christ—that He lived, He died, He was res-
urrected, and He lives again today. I have that
witness. That is one of the charges that the
Seventy receive; we are charged to be special
witnesses of Jesus Christ. 
I bear that witness to you that He indeed
does live, that He was resurrected, that He is
our Savior, and that He has wrought the
wonderful Atonement that will provide us
with the opportunity to return to our Father
and His Son, Jesus Christ, if we keep the
covenants and the commandments that have
been given to us by our prophets. I leave this
testimony and witness with you and wish you
all joy and happiness during this wonderful
Easter season. This is my humble prayer in
the name of Jesus Christ, amen.
a r t  c r e d i t s
Page 1: Illuminated Section, 1999. Page 20–21: You Will Find It,
2005. Page 25: Presence, 2005. Page 26: Remember This Day,
2005. David Linn, private collection.
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Ultimately, lawyering ∆ a delicate balancing between a con-
◊aπly evolving world and the fundameπal principl∂ that
deﬁne our legal sy◊em. It calls upon your compassion ∑ well ∑
your intelle±, your heart ∑ well ∑ your head. . . . [C]aring ∆
∑ much a part of the legal profession as iπelligence. . . . [I]t ∆
every lawyer’s re∏onsibility in every setting to serve others.2
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by Kristin B. Gerdy
Understanding clients and exercising
empathy and compassion comprise the heart
of lawyering. The Oxford English Dictionary
defines empathy as “the power of projecting
one’s personality into (and so fully compre-
hending) the object of contemplation.”3 The
English word empathy comes from the German
word Einfühlung, which literally translated
means “feeling into.”4 According to Carl
Rogers, the founder of the client-centered ther-
apy movement, to demonstrate true empathy
is “to sense the Client’s private world as if it
were your own, but without ever losing the ‘as
if ’ quality,”5 whereas compassion, which is
often mistakenly seen as synonymous with
empathy, is “the feeling or emotion when a
person is moved by the suffering or distress of
another and by the desire to relieve it; pity that
inclines one to spare or to succour.”6 This defi-
nition refers to the compassion given “towards
a person in distress by one who is free from it,
who is, in this respect, his superior.”7
Empathy and compassion must go hand
in hand with “thinking like a lawyer,” and in
fact, caring actually makes analysis stronger.
If we accept the premise that understanding
clients and demonstrating empathy and com-
passion are essential to the successful practice
of law, then it becomes important to under-
stand how they function in practice.
Laura Biering and Debby Stone, profes-
sional coaches and consultants who specialize
in working with lawyers, describe a hypo-
thetical lawyer whom they call Catherine.
Catherine is the typical law professor’s
“dream graduate”: top of her class, Order of
the Coif, highly recruited out of law school,
and ultimately settling on a prestigious law
firm.8 Members of the firm are impressed by
the work she does and by her intellect and
work ethic, and the overwhelming opinion is
that she is on a fast track to the top: certainly
partner, if not ultimately running the firm.
The only problem is that as she begins work-
ing closely with clients, the firm finds that
while she is certainly intelligent and compe-
tent, clients feel she doesn’t care about them: 
They felt she didn’t hear them. There was no con-
nection. It was as though she knew what they would
say before they even met. She would ask elaborate
questions, leading the clients to the answers she pre-
supposed. And when the clients offered new infor-
mation that didn’t fit with her agenda, she glossed
right over it.9
While Catherine may possess a great level of
legal knowledge, she lacks the greater intelli-
gence necessary to see the value in what her
client is saying, the value in really listening.
What she wrongly assumes is that her great
“intelligence” leads her to the arrogant and
ignorant position of believing that she knows
the answers before all of the information is on
the table.
The hypothetical story of Catherine
underscores the truth that “success in law (as
in other fields) correlates significantly more
with relationship skills than it does with intel-
ligence, writing ability, or any other known
factor.”10 Professor Joshua Rosenberg rightly
explains the interplay between the heart and
the head:
Basically, most lawyers and academics vastly over-
estimate the importance of reason and logic. We tend
to view them as both the primary motivator of our
behavior and the primary tool to change the thinking
and behavior of others. Although they are impor-
tant, they are only one part of the puzzle. There are
important differences between the kind of dispassion-
ate reasoning and analysis in which lawyers and law
students engage while sitting at desks at home, in the
office, or in the library, and the kind of activities in
which we engage when we are dealing in real time
with real people. Real-time, real-life interactions
implicate emotions, learned patterns of behavior,
habituated perspectives and frames of reference, and
other human, but not reasoned, responses.11
In other words, while analyzing the law and
using one’s intellectual skills is the key to
preparation, to learning the law, to conduct-
ing legal research, and to analyzing problems,
once the lawyer steps into the room with the
client, her understanding, empathy, and
compassion (which are often expressly mani-
fest in her ability to actually listen to the
client) become equally important. As other
scholars have noted,
Many lawyers believe that the practice of law
demands concentration of the facts of a case and
leaves no room for concern about the emotional state
of a client. These lawyers seem to approach each case
simply as a factual matter, giving at most minimal,
and more frequently no attention to the emotions of
their client. Most lawyers view the practice of law as
a set of legal problems that must be solved like a puz-
zle, rather than as a vocation which assists people
who have problems involving both factual and emo-
tional dimensions. Their primary orientation is the
problem; the person seems incidental.12
Not only does the involvement of empa-
thy and compassion in practice make clients
happier, it also makes lawyers happier.
According to Professor Rosenberg:
When asked what they like best about their work,
lawyers who like their work typically respond with
statements about relationships: “I like to help people”;
or “Last week, a client told me that what I did for her
made a big difference in her life”; or “I like being part
of a team.” Like other humans, lawyers get satisfac-
tion from helping others and from good relationships. .
. . Not only do relationship skills allow one to enjoy
her success, but, perhaps more importantly, they are
essential tools to achieve that success.13
Empathy, or “the power of projecting
one’s personality into (and so fully compre-
hending) the object of contemplation,”14 is 
a vital lawyering skill.15 Professor Carrie
Menkel-Meadow describes empathy as “learn-
ing how to ‘feel with’ others,” and she asserts
that empathy “is an essential part of the client-
lawyer relationship.”16 Empathy is central to
human relations and has been referred to 
as “the cornerstone of not only professional
interpersonal relations, but also any meaning-
ful human relationship.”17 Leading legal
counseling scholars have said that empathy “is
the real mortar of an attorney-client (indeed
any) relationship.”18
To “understand, from a human point of
view, what the other wants to happen in the
world” requires the lawyer to think, feel, and
understand what that person would think,
feel, and understand, to be what Professor
Martha Nussbaum terms “an intelligent
reader of that person’s story.”19 Simply put,
when a person experiences empathy, she is
able to “stand in the shoes” of the other per-
son. As Atticus Finch explained so clearly to
his daughter, Scout, in Harper Lee’s classic
novel To Kill a Mockingbird, “You never really
understand a person until you consider
things from his point of view . . . until you
climb into his skin and walk around in it.”20
Young Scout finally understood her father’s
lesson much later after Boo Radley, the
object of earlier mocking, saved her life and
that of her brother. After walking Mr.
Radley home, Scout reflects, “Atticus was
right. One time he said you never really
know a man until you stand in his shoes and
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walk around in them. Just standing on the
Radley porch was enough.”21
To experience empathy means to share or
at least understand a client’s feelings, to imag-
ine and thereby nonjudgmentally understand
what it would be like to be in the client’s posi-
tion.22 Once the lawyer has developed empa-
thy for the client, she can more effectively
exercise her other skills on the client’s
behalf.23
To be truly effective in the use of empa-
thy, the “intelligent reader” of the other’s
story must become the “accurate translator”
of that story to others. A lawyer fundamen-
tally is a translator.24 As such, she needs to be
able to empathize with the other side in order
to translate that point of view for her client
during settlement negotiations. She also needs
to empathize with what opposing counsel 
is experiencing in order to relate effectively
with her. She needs to empathize with the
judge or the jury in order to know their con-
cerns and address them as she conveys infor-
mation to her client and as she makes her
own strategic judgments. In other words,
empathy is fundamental to the hard-core
lawyering skills that affect results.
Despite some lawyers’ contentions that
developing empathy for the client is at best
uncomfortable and inefficient and at worst
inappropriate and manipulative, empathy
does play an important role in law practice.25
Every interaction a lawyer has with a client
involves an emotional component, and facili-
tating the client’s discussion of her emotions
through expressions of empathy is not only
appropriate but also beneficial to the lawyer-
client relationship and ultimately to the legal
case itself.26
Developing empathy is key to all types of
law practice—it isn’t just a trait for the litigator:
[T]he imagination of human distress, fear, anger, and overwhelming grief is an important attribute in the law.
Lawyers need it to understand and depict effectively the plight of their clients. Judges need it to sort out the
claims in the cases before them. Lawyers advising corporations need it in order to develop a complete picture of
the likely consequences of various policy choices for the lives of consumers, workers, and the public at large,
including the public in distant countries where corporations do business. Factual knowledge is crucial, and in
its absence the imagination can often steer us wrong. But knowledge is inert without the ability to make situa-
tions real inside oneself, to understand their human meaning.27
Thus, every lawyer must develop the capacity to empathize with others and in so doing
will increase her effectiveness. Specifically, empathy can aid the lawyer in building rapport with
her client, thus fostering a more beneficial relationship; foster open and complete communica-
tion; lead to more thorough legal analysis; improve the image of the legal profession; and satisfy
client expectations.
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ability to make 
situatio≥ real i≥ide 
on∂elf, to under-
◊and their human 
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First, instilling empathy in the relationship can improve rapport between lawyer and client
and thereby improve the relationship. While there is a lively scholarly debate about the ideal
relationship between lawyers and their clients and the roles that each should play to maximize
success,28 the unfortunate reality is that too many lawyers treat their clients like they are chil-
dren who must be supervised, watched over, and occasionally even disciplined. These lawyers
believe that they “know what is right” for the client and are willing to impose their views even
when the client objects.29
Relationships with clients are central, even critical, to the “helping professions,” which
include counseling, teaching, social work, ministry, and law.30 Positive relationships between
the professional and the client are conditioned upon “empathy, respect, and genuineness,”
which is primarily in the control of the professional rather than the client. Additionally,
“[r]apport, or mutual trust, is . . . central to a good client-professional relationship.”31 The most
important ingredient in establishing rapport is empathy. In therapeutic contexts research
shows that a therapist’s empathy is the “key behavioural element in professional-patient inter-
actions which builds the therapeutic alliance, increases patient motivation to participate
actively in treatment and is a predictor of successful outcomes.”32 The same is true with the
attorney-client relationship. When clients feel understood and believe that the lawyer is truly
interested in a successful solution to their
problems and concerns, the client becomes
less anxious and more at ease. And when a
lawyer truly empathizes with what a client is
feeling and experiencing, “decisions might
be made differently and the process of arriv-
ing at decisions might be made with more
consideration for the client’s actual needs.”33
Second, instilling empathy can improve
communication between lawyer and client.
Clients who feel that their lawyer under-
stands them are more willing to provide
information,34 including information that
might be potentially embarrassing yet impor-
tant to their case. “Active listening,” which is
a technique used to demonstrate empathy,
has long been heralded as the key to effective
legal interviewing and counseling. Through
active listening, empathic lawyers can bolster
their clients’ trust and more effectively open
lines of communication. Expressions of empa-
thy can also reduce client anxiety, which can
lead to increased accuracy and relevancy in
what the client tells the lawyer, and can pre-
vent, or at least diminish, hostility toward 
the lawyer.
Third, instilling empathy can enhance a
lawyer’s legal analysis. According to Professor
Lynne Henderson, empathy plays a role not
only in the lawyer’s analysis but also in the
decisions that are ultimately made by judges
and others. Empathy “aids both . . . the proce-
dure by which a judge . . . reaches a conclu-
sion . . . [and the] justif[ication for] the
conclusion . . . in a way that disembodied rea-
son simply cannot.”35
Fourth, instilling empathy in individual
lawyer’s client interaction may ultimately
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Developing empathy
requir∂ the 
lawyer to set aside 
her analytical 
tendenci∂ and simply 
learn to feel.
improve the public’s perception of lawyers
and the legal profession. If, as described above,
many Americans feel that lawyers are uncar-
ing and even manipulative, an increase of
empathy among individual lawyers may 
benefit the overall image of the profession.36
Finally, instilling empathy satisfies client
expectations. Clients expect at least some
degree of empathy from their lawyers. In 
fact, empathy is specifically mentioned by
Consumer Reports editors in their article advis-
ing people about what to do when they need
a lawyer:
Communication with your attorney is crucial.
Before you hire anyone, make sure you’ll feel com-
fortable speaking honestly and opening with him or
her. Take note, too, of whether the lawyer can
explain things clearly. Make it known that you want
to be kept informed of what happens in the case, and
agree on some ground rules—perhaps that you’ll be
sent copies of documents or given periodic reports
over the phone. That doesn’t mean that your lawyer
has to be your best friend. But you might expect him
or her to be empathetic and supportive if you’re going
through a crisis.37
While empathy is certainly beneficial to
the lawyer’s practice and her relationship with
clients, lawyers should be cautioned that too
much empathy—in other words, “too com-
plete identification with the client”—may be
harmful. Effective lawyers must be able to
“step back from the client’s situation, in ways
that the client often cannot, in order to pro-
vide the critical eye and assessments that are
part of [the lawyer’s] obligation to him.”38 Although too much empathy may cause problems,
lack of empathy certainly will. Lawyers have to be objective, but not robotic. They must hone
their empathic skills, and that takes training and practice.
Unlike learning how to analyze a case or write a persuasive argument, learning to empathize
requires the lawyer to engage her ability to empathize with and care for her client in addition to
her ability to analyze, strategize, and advocate. Developing empathy requires the lawyer to set
aside her analytical tendencies and simply learn to feel. Professor Joshua Rosenberg explains that
“[e]mpathy is not entirely, or even primarily, a cognitive experience. Indeed, it involves the
momentary suspension of most of the key cognitive functions.”39 Such intellectual functions as
judgment, evaluation, analysis, and problem solving must be set aside to allow the person to
empathize with another. Doing this requires the person to do more than read or think; it requires
her to actually place herself in positions to experience what the other person is feeling.
To fully empathize with a client, a lawyer must actually experience the legal world from the
client’s point of view; the lawyer must try to figuratively “walk in the skin” of her client.
Occasionally lawyers have the opportunity (if they can call it that) to actually be a client—to be
involved as a party to a lawsuit. That experience can be a tremendous opportunity to learn
empathy. Gail Leverett Parenti, former president of the Florida Defense Lawyers Association,
tells of her experience as a defendant in numerous cases including a malpractice action that
lasted 15 years and how these experiences taught her things and gave her “insights [she] couldn’t
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have learned in any other way” about what 
it means to be a client.40 For example, she
relates that lawyers “can’t have a true appreci-
ation of the anguish, the sleepless nights, 
the self-doubt, the depression, the impotent
rage, the frustration with the legal system,
the delays and the endless nonsense that a lit-
igant experiences until [they] have experi-
enced it first-hand.”41
But lawyers need not actually be involved
as clients in litigation to have at least limited
personal experience with what their clients
are feeling. Lawyers can gain a level of under-
standing and empathy by meeting their
clients in “their environment” rather than in
the sterile law office. Being in the client’s
environment helps the lawyer see firsthand
what the client experiences. For example, a
domestic relations lawyer could interview her
clients in a shelter for battered women—or at
the very least she could spend a few hours
volunteering there to better understand and
appreciate the plight of the women who
come there for solace.
Lawyers can also develop their empathic
skills by participating in role-playing and
other simulation scenarios with their col-
leagues. Such hands-on, participative experi-
ence is essential to gaining true empathy
because “studies indicate that learning to
care must be situated in concrete learning
rather than in general, abstracted learning.”42
Such experiential learning must be repeated
throughout a lawyer’s career, because empa-
thy or “the imagination of human predica-
ments is like a muscle: it atrophies unless it is
continually used.”43
In addition to being aware that they need
to find concrete experiences in which to come
in contact with the feelings and experiences of
their clients, lawyers wishing to develop
greater empathy must be aware of behaviors
and character traits that detract from empa-
thy. Smith and Nester summarized empathy-
detracting behaviors including:
Saying nothing, failing to accurately respond to the
client, using clichés, distorting what the client says,
ignoring his feelings, putting the client’s problem in a
bigger picture too soon, ignoring client clues about the
inaccuracy of the lawyer’s responses to him, feigning
understanding, parroting the client’s words back to
him, allowing the client to ramble too much, doing
nothing else but communicating empathy, seeming
overeager, using inappropriate language, using legal jargon or stilted phrases, being longwinded, making wrong
choices about whether to respond to the client’s feelings or the content of his speech, responding to the feelings of
the client too quickly, responding defensively or negatively to client questions, asking too many questions, asking
only leading questions, and asking questions whose answers do not help the lawyer in counseling the client.44
Thus, developing and exercising empathy is key to successful lawyering. 
In addition to showing empathy—feeling with the client—a successful, effective lawyer
also shows compassion and feels “for” her client—she feels that desire to relieve her client’s dis-
tress and provide aid and succour. Dean Kevin J Worthen acknowledged this reality to a group
of law students on their first day of law school:
Because of the ubiquity and complex nature of law in our society, people are required to trust lawyers with their
hopes, their dreams, their fortunes, their rights, and sometimes even their lives. How lawyers deal with those
precious commodities is of extreme importance to those people. . . . [H]ow important it is that [lawyers] learn to
really care enough about the human condition that they will refine and use those skills to improve others’ lives.45
The lawyer’s ability to care for others has been lauded by multiple leaders in the legal commu-
nity. For example, Paul L. Stevens, then president of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, wrote that
lawyers “need to become more compassionate about [their] clients. [Lawyers] need to show [their
clients that they] care for them, and [lawyers] need to communicate with [their clients] as people,
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not treat them as just another case. We need to let them feel they are helping ‘run the store.’”46
Similarly, Maryland Lieutenant Governor Michael Steele, speaking at the Catholic University
Law School, exhorted students: “Be a lawyer, yes, be a good lawyer, absolutely, but be a man or
woman . . . whose words and deeds are touched by . . . compassion and abundant love.”47
Compassion deeply engrained in a lawyer can provide the reason and the motivation for
the hard work, long hours, and personal dedication necessary to succeed in law practice. As
Sharon Salzberg stated:
Compassion is not at all weak. It is the strength that arises out of seeing the true nature of suffering in the
world. Compassion allows us to bear witness to that suffering, whether it is in ourselves or others, without
fear; it allows us to name injustice without hesitation, and to act strongly, with all the skill at our disposal.48
Some lawyers may mistakenly believe
that compassion detracts from their ability to
practice law or even makes it impossible for
them to do some of the things that lawyers
frequently find that they must do in practice.
For example, some lawyers may believe that if
they develop compassion in their practice
they might have difficulty impeaching a hos-
tile witness at trial, painting the facts in the
light most advantageous for their client, or in
other ways zealously advocating for their
clients. While this may be true to a small
extent for some lawyers, it is a small price to
pay for the other benefits of compassion.
In her piece about enlightened advocacy
and a more humanistic and holistic approach
to lawyering, Ingrid Tollefson made the fol-
lowing key observation:
The lawyer as nurturer implies a focus on the
client’s needs encompassing humanistic, analytical,
and technical approaches to conflict resolution. The
metaphor, however, does not imply a “new-age,”
“feel-good,” “touchy-feely,” or “warm-fuzzy”
approach to lawyering. Proficiency in the intellec-
tual and technical rigors of legal analysis, or “think-
ing like a lawyer” is fundamental to capable and
accomplished lawyering. However, compassion is
equally pragmatic. It functions as an essential and
practical component of the nurturing practice.
Thus, for the nurturing lawyer, ambition to master
critical reading, writing, argument, and reasoning
skills met with the ambition to cultivate compassion
creates the ideal for what it means to be “successful”
in the art of legal advocacy and counseling.49
Despite its possible misuse, compassion
plays an important role in the effective prac-
tice of law. In fact, lawyers need to develop
and express compassion to best serve their
clients because “the quality that elevates us
from being a great lawyer and moves us into
the next level is simply caring.”50
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To be truly 
eΩe±ive in the use 
of empathy,
the “iπelligeπ reader” 
of the other’s ◊ory 
mu◊ become the 
“accurate translator” 
of that ◊ory 
to others. A lawyer 
fundameπally ∆ 
a tra≥lator.
Compassion plays a role in nearly all
interactions with clients, but it is essential in
those where emotions are strong and pain
very real. Philip Weinstein, of the Rhode
Island Bar Association, reminds lawyers that
family law is ripe with the need for compas-
sion: “It behooves us to work to better under-
stand and appreciate the pain and grief that
people go through with a failed marriage, the
pain their children endure, and the anger that
people feel in a divorce.”51 But compassion
and care is not limited to the personal emo-
tions of family law, it is key in other litigation
contexts as well. For example, lawyers can
show compassion for plaintiffs injured because
of another’s negligence or for a patient whose
life is forever changed because of medical
malpractice.52
Truly compassionate lawyers also find
opportunities to extend care to those accused
of negligent behavior or even “for a physi-
cian who is being sued for producing an
injury despite his Hippocratic Oath to do no
harm.”53 Compassion even comes into play
in purely transactional practice as lawyers
extend care to aging parents who seek to
create an estate plan to best protect their
children or structure business arrangements
between partners who ultimately may have
differences that lead to the dissolution of 
the partnership.
Finally, lawyers should develop compas-
sion because their clients often value it.
When a client feels that a lawyer truly cares
about her and is compassionate, she feels that
the lawyer is loyal to her cause and “can be a
source of emotional sustenance, particularly
for those clients whose legal problems are as
painful as they are complex.”54With the emo-
tional support of a compassionate lawyer, the
client may be better equipped to face a long,
difficult legal battle. A client who feels com-
passion from her lawyer “may be more
responsive to the lawyer’s advice, and while
this possibility opens the door to manipula-
tion, it also offers the hope that good advice,
which would have been discounted by a more
reserved client, will now be taken seriously.”
Compassionate lawyers bear the burdens
of others, namely, their clients. Lawyer F.
Burton Howard once said that it “is the prin-
cipal business of a lawyer to bear the burdens
of another.”55 Speaking to a group of alumni
from the byu Law School, James E. Faust,56
a former attorney, encouraged them to “[l]ook
upon [their] learning and license to practice
law as a way to do great things for little 
people and little things for everyone.”57 The
ways that lawyers can serve others differ
from the more tangible services provided by
those in other professions like engineering 
or medicine, but, as John W. Davis once
remarked, that service is equally valued and
necessary. He said,
True, we build no bridges. We raise no towers. We
construct no engines. We paint no pictures—unless
as amateurs for our own amusement. There is little
of all that we do which the eye of man can see. But
we smooth out difficulties; we relieve stress; we cor-
rect mistakes; we take up other men’s burdens and by
our efforts we make possible the peaceful life of men
in a peaceful state.58
Compassionate lawyers can hardly be
restrained from trying to render assistance
and to bring healing when they witness suf-
fering, pain, and other injustice. A moving
example of the desire to bear another’s bur-
den is found in the following story, shared by
an extraordinary lawyer:
[A] few weeks ago, I went to see one of the children
who is a named plaintiff in a mental health class
action I am litigating in Massachusetts. He lives
with his grandmother in a tiny, one-bedroom apart-
ment also shared by his aunt, her husband, and their
two infant children. He has profound behavioral and
language challenges, strikes out frequently and hugs,
a bit roughly, almost as frequently. He has much to
say but can barely speak. He loves to play but has no
one to play with. He is loved by his grandmother but
almost no one else. As a result of his behavioral chal-
lenges, complex needs, and poverty, he is isolated,
segregated, and abandoned by most educational and
mental health providers. I had been spending long
hours on this complex case on behalf of the class of
children and had little time left over for individual
advocacy. But when I left his tiny apartment, got in
my car and closed my eyes, I made a decision that I
would do everything in my power to alter this des-
perate situation. I vowed to represent him in what-
ever forums, for however long, in whatever ways
necessary to remedy this neglect.59
Truly this lawyer has developed compassion,
and all lawyers can help to bear the burdens
of others as they focus on the people they
serve and seek solutions for the problems
they face.
Further, compassionate lawyers comfort
those who stand in need of comfort. Often
this comfort is given by small acts of compas-
sion that may or may not be directly related
to the legal proceedings in which the lawyer
is involved. Sometimes this compassion is
shown simply by the way the lawyer interacts
with the client and in the relationship that
develops between the two. The lawyer who
could not be restrained from aiding the strug-
gling boy in Massachusetts shared this exam-
ple of compassionate comforting:
Laurie was a client of mine at the Northampton
State Hospital. She was a twenty-five year old
woman who had been institutionalized for eight
years. She was afraid to talk to anyone. I spent
almost a year, visiting with her at least once a
week. For months we only sat quietly together.
After a while we held hands, and gradually she
began to respond to my questions, albeit with only
a nod of her head. Eventually we started having
conversations. A year later she initiated these con-
versations, eagerly and with a smile on her face.
She told me of her abuse, and witnessing the abuse
of her siblings. Eventually, as her confidant and
dedicated advocate, I helped her leave the hospital
and move to a community home. When she died a
few years later . . . I cried because I had lost a dear
friend. But her presence and friendship was an
enormous teaching in patience and compassion.60
While this lawyer did offer traditional legal
services to Laurie, perhaps the most impor-
tant service he rendered was by being a
comforter and a friend. Lawyers can employ
that same compassion in their interactions
with opposing counsel and others by seek-
ing to transcend the adversarial nature of
the proceedings. The following story about
an otherwise typical lawyer illustrates such
integration:
Litigation is often contentious; sometimes overly so.
On one occasion, this lawyer found himself in a depo-
sition involving several attorneys, one of whom
repeatedly verbally abused one of the other lawyers,
engaging in personal attacks and tirades. [The
lawyer], somewhat stunned, did little to intervene on
behalf of the victim, in part because the issues which
sparked the outbursts had nothing to do with his
client. That evening, however, he felt horrible. He
resolved that he would never again allow that to hap-
pen to another attorney or witness when he was pres-
ent . . . . He has kept that resolve to this day.61
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By bearing burdens, giving comfort, and
showing care in their interactions with oth-
ers, lawyers can demonstrate compassion in
their professional practice.
Kristin B. Gerdy, ’95, is a teaching professor and the
director of the Rex E. Lee Advocacy Program at the J.
Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University.
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James R. Rasband Named New 
J. Reuben Clark Law School Dean
James R. Rasband’s appointment 
as dean of the J. Reuben Clark 
Law School was announced by
Academic Vice President John S.
Tanner on April 17, 2009, and
became effective June 15, 2009.
Dean Rasband replaces Interim
Dean James D. Gordon III, who
served during the 2008–2009 school
year, following the appointment of
former Law School dean Kevin J
Worthen as advancement vice pres-
ident at Brigham Young University.
“Jim Rasband will be a superb
dean,” said Tanner. “I have worked
closely with Jim for two years. He
has tremendous gifts of mind and
heart along with high standards,
people skills, administrative expe-
rience, and a love for the Law
School. I expect the Law School to
flourish under his leadership.”
A byu alumnus, Rasband
received his juris doctorate from
Harvard Law School in 1989. He
was a law clerk for Judge J. Clifford
Wallace on the u.s. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. He
practiced law at Perkins Coie in
Seattle, and in 1995 he joined the
faculty at the Law School, where he
is Hugh W. Colton Professor of Law.
He served as associate dean for
research and academic affairs at
the Law School from 2004 to 2008.
Since 2008 he has served as associ-
ate academic vice president for fac-
ulty at Brigham Young University.
“I am thrilled to return from
university administration to the
Law School,”  says Dean Rasband.
“It is a remarkable place with a
legacy of outstanding students as
well as committed faculty, admin-
istration, and staff.   I am con-
vinced that, as our faculty
continue to strive collectively and
individually to have an enduring
influence in the lives of the stu-
dents and in the development of
law, policy, and theory in their
particular legal fields, our stu-
dents will, in turn, build upon their
predecessors’ legacy and be an
increasing influence for good in
the nation, in their communities,
in the Church, and in their homes.”
Dean Rasband’s primary areas
of expertise are public lands
(including public lands legal his-
tory), water law, wilderness and
grazing law, regulations covering
the national parks and national
monuments, and international
environmental law. He is a coau-
thor, along with James Salzman 
at Duke University and Mark
Squillace at the University of
Colorado, of Natural Resources Law
and Policy, a casebook used in 
law schools around the country. 
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byu Law Professor Heads u.s.
Bureau of Indian Affairs
On June 26, 2009, Brigham Young
University law professor Larry
EchoHawk was sworn in to head
the u.s. Bureau of Indian Affairs.
EchoHawk vowed to do all in his
power to combat the poverty, poor
schools, and crime that are too
common in Indian country. “It’s the
opportunity to affect the lives of
nearly 2 million American Indians
and Alaska Natives. Many of these
people live in poverty. There are
communities of American Indians
that have nearly 80 percent unem-
ployment. I’m going to do what-
ever I can to improve their quality
of life.”
Interior Secretary Ken Salazar
extolled EchoHawk: “He is a dedi-
cated public servant with excellent
leadership abilities, legal expertise,
and legislative experience to help
us carry out President Obama’s
commitment to build strong Indian
economies and safer Indian com-
munities. Together we will work
cooperatively with the federally
recognized tribes to empower
American Indian and Alaska
Native people, restore the integrity
of the government-to-government
relationship, and fulfill the United
States’ trust responsibilities.”
A member of the Pawnee
Nation of Oklahoma, EchoHawk
made history when he was 
elected attorney general of Idaho
in 1990. He was the first American
Indian in u.s. history elected to a
statewide office. He had served 
as the Bannock County pros-
ecuting attorney since 1986.
Before that, EchoHawk served 
two consecutive terms in the
Idaho House of Representatives,
from 1982 to 1986. 
Curt Conklin Receives National
Law Librarian Award
On July 26, 2009, Curt E. Conklin,
associate director for technical 
services at byu Howard W. Hunter
Law Library, received the Renee D.
Chapman Memorial Award for
Outstanding Contributions in
Technical Services Law Librarianship
in Washington, d.c. This award is
presented each year to an individual
or group in recognition of extended
service to technical services law
librarianship and to the American
Association of Law Libraries (aall).
“This award is the highest honor
a law cataloger can receive in this
country and it is the equivalent 
of a lifetime achievement award in
technical services law librarian-
ship,” said Kory Staheli, director of
the Howard W. Hunter Law Library.
“Curt is well deserving of such an
honor and I am very pleased that
the American Association of Law
Libraries has chosen to recognize
his many contributions to the field
of law librarianship with this very
prestigious award.”
Curt has worked with the 
byu Howard W. Hunter Law
Library for 37 years in a variety of
positions, all within technical 
services, retiring from the library
in May 2009. He has also been 
a member of aall for 35 years.
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Called to Preside 
J. Reuben Clark Law Society
member Ruth Lybbert, partner at
the Salt Lake City law firm of
Dewsup King & Olsen, along with
her husband, Dale G. Renlund,
cardiologist, will respectively wrap
up their two successful careers
before moving to Johannesburg,
South Africa, in July 2009. Called
to the First Quorum of Seventy,
Elder Renlund will serve as the
second counselor in the Africa
Southeast Area Presidency.
Ruth Lybbert graduated
from the University of Maryland
Law School. She is a past presi-
dent of the Utah Association for
Justice (uaj), a professional
organization dedicated to hold-
ing wrongdoers accountable for
their actions and to preserving
trial by jury. She chairs the 
Judicial Conduct Commission, 
the body charged with investi-
gating complaints against Utah
judges. She formerly served on 
the Utah Supreme Court Advisory
Committee for Professionalism
and is a director of the Deseret
News Publishing Company and 
of the Workers Compensation
Fund of Utah.
Six New Mission 
Presidents 
The following J. Reuben Clark
Law School alumni and jrc
Law Society members have
been called to preside over
missions: G. Mark Albright, 
’81, with his wife, Karyn Jean
Wasden, to the Washington
d.c. South Mission; Armand D.
Johansen, ’78, with his wife,
Juliet Warner, to the Norway
Oslo Mission; Larry R. Laycock,
’86, and his wife, Lisa Dawn
Gleave, to the Chile Santiago
East Mission; Jay D. Pimentel,
’79, and his wife, Colleen Reed,
to the Germany Berlin Mission;
Vladimir A. Nechiporov and
his wife, Elena E. Nechiporova,
to the Russia Rostov Mission;
and Gregory Mark Saylin and
his wife, Jennifer Ashleigh, 
to the Texas Houston South
Mission.
Two Called to 
Quorums of Seventy 
Brent H. Nielson, J. Reuben Clark
Law Society member, has been
called to the First Quorum of the
Seventy. He had been serving 
as a member of the Fifth Quorum
of the Seventy in the Idaho 
Area when called. Elder Nielson
received a bachelor of arts degree
in English from Brigham Young
University and a law degree from
the University of Utah and has
been an attorney/partner at a law
firm since 1985. He is married to
Marcia Ann Bradford.
Wilford W. Andersen, ’76,
has been called to the Second
Quorum of the Seventy. Elder
Andersen was serving as a mem-
ber of the Sixth Quorum of the
Seventy in the North America
Southwest Area when he was
called. He received both a bache-
lor’s degree in business manage-
ment and a juris doctor degree
from Brigham Young University.
He has been a managing partner
of an investment firm since 1969
in Mesa, Arizona. Elder Andersen
is married to Kathleen Bennion.
New Temple President
byu law professor Stanley 
D. Neeleman and his wife,
Sheryl Hunt, have been
called to serve as the Sao
Paul Brazil Temple president
and matron. Previously, he
served as the president of
the Brazil Sao Paulo South
Mission. 
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i  awoke with a start when my alarm went off at 5  a .m.  the morning of the hike
to Stewart Falls in Provo Canyon. We gathered in the predawn darkness, and I hiked alone, listening to the bits
and pieces of conversation going on all around me. We arrived at the falls greeted by the first morning light. By
then I could see the faces of my fellow hikers. I noted, as I often do, the ratio of men to women was about 3:1.
We sang the traditional hymns sung at Stewart Falls. There was a particularly moving moment when the sun
broke brilliantly through the gathering storm clouds just as we started to sing “The Day Dawn Is Breaking.” I was
especially pleased to have a baritone singing just behind me. I hardly heard my own singing as I listened to his
deep, rich, resonate voice. Standing there at the falls singing hymns with all those men flooded me with warm
memories of singing as one of a few sister missionaries in much larger groups of elders. There is something unpar-
alleled in the power and tone of men’s singing groups. To be sure, there were women in both groups, but our
voices were swallowed up in the sheer numbers of men singing in full voice.
I mused on both experiences as I hiked back to the conference, and a small ray of sunshine broke through the
clouds of my thoughts. The music sung by men alone is inspiring; however, most great composers write music for
the breadth of human voices: bass, tenor, alto, and soprano. In Spain, at Stewart Falls, and all too often in the legal
profession, I see the faces of women but often find it difficult to hear their voices despite understanding that all
four principle parts create a far more compelling chorus.
I have witnessed the positive differences an alto or soprano can make in a chorus otherwise dominated by
basses and tenors. The recommendation of a sister missionary regarding the training of new missionaries and their
senior companions resulted in a markedly more effective method for both. In my work as a guardian ad litem, I
saw better outcomes for my clients with the perspective given from a four-part chorus. For example, a 17-year-old
suffered years of abuse at the hands of her father. With very little evidence to mitigate the father’s behavior, all
were prepared for the maximum sentence. However, the young victim had a very different point of view. She
wanted her father to get much needed help but did not want him summarily removed from her life. The prosecu-
tor set aside her own ambition and honored the wishes of the victim, explaining that the victim deserved to be
heard after so many years of silence. The judge grudgingly issued a sentence near the minimum mandatory. 
In music and in the practice of law, we are all diminished if one or more choral sections is muted. There are
experiences inherent in the lives of women in the law that regularly inform different perspectives. There are occa-
sions when notes are left out of a chord or a voice is left out of a legal proceeding. At first, it can be hardly notice-
able, but over time the chord and ultimately legal decisions will sound hollow because neither resonates properly.
In joining together, the varied strengths of each choral voice are magnified and weaknesses minimized. I’m sure
we can’t imagine the music we can make by engaging a full range of voices in our legal associations. 
The Clark Memorandum welcomes the submission of short essays and anecdotes from its read-
ers. Send your short article (750 words or less) for “Life in the Law” to wisej@lawgate.byu.edu.
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Reaching Full Harmony: 
Hearing Women in the Law
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